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“When in 1955 it was thus proposed to establish a Common Market the people 
of Europe still remembered the war, and were willing to accept measures 
which could guarantee peace and freedom. Peace and freedom were in the 
minds of both those who had visions of a brotherhood of European nations and 
of those who wanted to secure prosperity by creating a wider market for trade 
and industry. During the years which have passed since then, the fears of 
tyranny and war have faded. The organization known as the European 
Communities is no longer seen as a preserver of peace and liberty. The 
prosperity which so many had hoped for has come and has gone away again. 
Today the former enthusiasm for a united Europe has evaporated.”
Ole Lando – Speech delivered on the opening of the FIDE Congress on June 22, 1978
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Summary
The financial crisis in the EU has been and still is a very researched topic. Because it 
affected negatively the assets of many individuals, the demand for academic text explaining the 
crisis is high. This is why, today there are countless books and articles dealing with the causes of 
the crisis and offering solutions how to overcome it.
In this particular field, economics and law are very interconnected and require the author 
of the academic work to be familiar with both. However, even though this thesis uses many 
economic terms, its purpose is to present a legal analysis of the crisis and examine the changes 
in EU law caused by it. Therefore, this thesis offers different view and supplements the books 
which analyse the EU financial crisis from an economic perspective.
As the topic suggests, the principle of rule of law is central to this thesis. This principle is 
important as it is the basis upon which the EU is built. However, similarly to fundamental rights, 
this principle is weakened in times of crisis. In this regard, there have been many cases before 
the Court of Justice concerning the legality of EU measures that intended to combat the financial 
crisis and its negative consequences. The approach of the Court towards these cases seems to 
differ from the approach to the cases pre-crisis. However, the principle rule of law must equally 
apply at all times, including times of crisis.
The principle of rule of law is examined from the perspective of the EU institutions and 
bodies – the European Central Bank, as the main actor in the economic and monetary union; the 
Commission, as the executive of the Union, the various EU agencies as fulfilling certain tasks and 
finally, the Court of Justice of the EU as judicial authority which oversees the uniform application 
and interpretation of EU law. Each of these institutions has its role in the way out of the crisis. 
Moreover, each institution while fulfilling its tasks must conform with the principle of rule of law. 
Accordingly, a separate chapter is reserved in this thesis for the ECB. It was the most engaged 
institution when it comes to the crisis, but at the same time the most criticized institution.
Another chapter deals with all the other above-mentioned institutions and bodies, which are 
examined in different parts of that chapter.
These two chapters present the characteristics and historic development of the 
institutions or the bodies, but at the same time critically asses their actions and their role in the 
financial crisis. This is because every action of an EU institution or body affects the principle of 
rule of law and the overall legal system of the EU.
This thesis ultimately sheds light on the central points of discussion which are presented 
in point 1.3 below. It gives the reader information regarding the status of the principle of rule of 
law in mid- and post-crisis Europe.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Background
The principle of rule of law is the core of every modern society. The EU has long ago 
surpassed the basic economic agenda and has evolved into a more of a political union1 which 
required certain measures to be introduced for the purposes of legitimacy and legality. This was 
achieved most notably with the creation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.2 The Lisbon
Treaty3 states that the Treaties draw inspiration ‘from the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and 
inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law. 
Moreover, Article 2 TEU states that, among others, the rule of law and human rights are values 
on which the EU is founded. In this regard, the Court has also stressed the importance of the rule 
of law, most notably in the Les Verts case4 by stating that EU is based on the rule of law.
However, it is when one society considers such values to be only its inspiration, but not 
its aspiration, that those values become most fragile. It is when the citizens are not vigilant 
enough, because they consider such values to be ultimately achieved – that those values suffer
the biggest threats. Therefore, the rule of law can never be taken for granted, no matter how 
advanced the society is. This is particularly relevant in times of crisis, when the authorities are 
willing to do ‘whatever it takes’5 to save the troubled entity from falling apart.
The EU started as an ambitious project.6 Its founding fathers were aware that it cannot 
be achieved through a single plan and it would require time and dedication from all of its 
constituents. However, it is unlikely that they predicted the challenges it faces today. The 
geopolitical pressure, the social tensions and above all the economic uncertainty have given rise 
to Euroscepticism more than ever before. Some would even say that the EU and the Economic 
and Monetary Union are on the verge of collapsing.7
1 It can even be said that the EU is a federation in statu nascendi – see B. Koch and R. Eising, The Transformation of 
Governance in the European Union (Routledge, 1999) preface, p. 1.
2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2012/C 326/2.
3 Amendments to the Treaty to European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
17.12.2007 C 306/1, Article 1(1).
4 Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] EU:C:1986:166, para. 23.
5 Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, at the Global Investment Conference in London 26 July 2012
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html
6 ‘[The ECSC] will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to 
the preservation of peace’ - The Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950.
7 Among which is the Otmar Issing, one of the architects of the monetary union 
http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2473842/otmar-issing-on-why-the-euro-
house-of-cards-is-set-to-collapse
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Aside from such predictions, it is a fact that the financial crisis has affected the EU legal 
system as a whole. Without such crisis, a deeper EMU would not be a priority of the Juncker 
Commission.8 The role of the Commission and the other EU institutions in the financial crisis is 
crucial, therefore will be assessed separately in different parts in this thesis. Moreover, the MS 
have also agreed to deepen the integration in the EMU and the internal market for financial 
services, under the pressure of the crisis. Even outside of the EU framework, the MS have taken 
action through international treaties.9
All this has led to a real gross domestic product growth rate of 2.2% in 2015, the highest 
since 2007,10 and average government deficit of 2.4%, the lowest since 2008.11 As the economy 
started growing, the unemployment rate fell to 8.1% in the beginning of 2017, the lowest since 
2009.12 From this it seems that the changes in the EU legal order are having the desired results, 
as the EU economy at present is similar to that of pre-crisis times.
However, such economic parameters are only one side of the coin. The other side is that 
crisis-induced measures may contradict well-established rules and principles. Furthermore, such 
measures are concerned with the long-term stability of the Union, the fruits of which are not to 
be seen in the present, or even in the foreseeable future. Because of this, on the one hand 
individuals may feel presently neglected by the Union and lose trust in it,13 and on the other the
MS may be reluctant to accept further integration and transfers of sovereignty to European level.
One indicator of this is the number of cases brought before the Court of Justice, which
has risen proportionally as EU action increased. More importantly, the number of cases the 
subject-matter of which is approximation of laws has increased twice in 2013 compared to 
previous years. The number of such cases has remained high in the years that followed. 14 Also, 
there has been a significant increase in the cases concerning the economic and monetary policy 
of the Union, but more importantly those cases have been controversial and attracted a great 
amount of criticism.
This points to the fact that the way out of the financial crisis may not have been as smooth 
as the economic values show. The changes brought by the crisis exceed the realm of 
macroeconomics and go deep into the constitutional and integration processes. This certainly did 
not go unnoticed by the MS, particularly the UK, which challenged many of the measures which 
8 Commission Work Programme 2017, COM (2016) 710 final, p. 10.
9 Inter alia, Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance D/12/2 2012 and Treaty establishing the European 
Stability Mechanism T/ESM 2012-LT 2012.
10 Eurostat, Real GDP growth rate – volume.
11 Ibid, General government deficit/surplus.
12 Ibid, Unemployment by sex and age - monthly average.
13 In 2013, the EU citizens' confidence in EU institutions was lowest in history, source: EU Barometer.
14 Court of Justice of the European Union - Annual report 2016 judicial activity p.95.
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redesigned the institutional architecture of the EU. Individuals also challenged certain acts which 
reformed the substantive law of the EU, especially those concerning bank resolution and the 
granting of state aid. Those acts have affected the legal and economic position of individual 
depositors and the way in which their investments are used when a bank fails. The depositors 
claimed that this was an infringement of the right to property and/or breach of the principle of 
proportionality and sought the Court to remedy such situation. These cases are going to be 
critically assessed in the text that follows.
It is normal to expect that the resolution of any serious crisis would require reforms in all 
fields of the law, including the basic principles falling within the constitutional domain. It is also 
normal to expect individual rights, such as that to property, to be limited when that would protect 
the economy and minimise the risk of systemic failure. Nevertheless, there is a set of core rules, 
mostly in the form of general principles and values, which cannot at any time be disregarded. The 
rule of law is one of those principles.
It is a common misperception that the official authorities, unlike individuals, always stay 
within the boundaries of the law and their practices are legal. However, this is far from the truth 
and therefore this thesis has the purpose of critically examining the actions of the EU institutions
and the way in which they handled the financial crisis. This includes the Court of Justice whose 
judgments have a major impact on the future functioning of the EU and are, consequently, going 
to be presented and analysed.
1.2 Research method and outline
The thesis uses the legal dogmatic approach as a main research method. This method 
consists of presentation and interpretation of EU legal acts and case-law. In addition to positive 
EU law, old EU laws which are no longer valid and soft law are going to be referred to. The 
purpose of such an approach is to examine how the financial crisis has influenced EU law and 
how the principle of rule of law in the EU have been affected by this.
Apart from presenting the law as it exists – de lege lata, this thesis is going to critically 
assess the law and propose solutions for how the law can be improved – de lege ferenda. 
Constant improvement and adaptation are crucial for a smooth functioning of a dynamic field 
such as the EMU. Moreover, no two crises are the same and the defences built against the last 
known crisis do not protect from the next one, which remains unknown.15 This is why it is 
particularly important for scholars and legal practitioners to present their views on how the law 
can be developed in the future. The present thesis adopts such an approach.
15 H. Kalimo and M. Jansson, EU economic law in time of crisis (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) p. 26.
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Lastly, the comparative method is going to be relied on as a supplementary method, 
mostly in comparing the EU with the United States of America.  The latter has also had a financial 
crisis and has differently coped with it. Admittedly, the US functions differently and in this regard,
the Court has stated that the EU differs from other public law entities, therefore cannot be 
compared to them.16 Nevertheless, contrasting the EU with the US or other states could lead to 
more reasoned solutions and proposals, thus it is used in this thesis.
Regarding the outlook, this main part of this thesis begins with a chapter which examines
the role of the ECB in the financial crisis and its measures to combat the crisis. The ECB is the 
main actor in the EMU and has had major influence in the development of the EU in the financial 
crisis. Also, from its inception, the status of the ECB has been uncertain, to the point that it has 
been considered a ‘special’ institution. This uncertainty seemed to have been put to rest by the 
OLAF case.17 However, only the ECB possesses effective mechanisms to fight the crisis, thus 
becoming crucial to the resolution of the crisis. This led to the question regarding the status of 
the ECB to be opened once again, as discussed below. Consequently, the ECB is the first EU 
institution to be examined in this thesis.
In the second chapter of the main part, other instructions of the Union are presented, 
among which are the European Commission, the EU agencies and the CJEU. The Commission is 
the guardian of the Treaties that oversees the application of EU law18 and proposes legislative 
initiatives to the Parliament and Council.19 Moreover, the Commission can adopt non-legislative 
acts of general application.20 On the other hand, the role of EU agencies, together with their 
number, is constantly on the rise.21 Such agencies were also established in the financial sector 
and assisted the EU institutions in the financial crisis. Aside from this, there are many issues with 
the establishment of these agencies. Thus, a significant part of the second chapter of the main 
part focuses on EU agencies.
Lastly, judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU are presented and analysed. As 
expected, many of the issues encountered during the financial crisis had to be settled by the 
Court. Such judgments created precedents22 and de facto affected the future functioning of the 
EU. It is important to examine how the Court coped with the difficult task of balancing different 
objectives. On the one hand, the ambitious institutions of the EU tried to ‘save the Union’ and on 
the other the overprotecting individuals tried to defend their rights. It follows that the Court 
16 Case C-359/92 Germany v. Council [1994] EU:C:1994:306, para.38. The European Court of Human Rights has also 
stated that the nature of the EU is ‘sui generis’, see ECtHR Judgment of 18/2/1999 – 24833/94 Denise Matthews v. 
United Kingdom, para. 48.
17 Case C-11/00 Commission v ECB [2003] EU:C:2003:395.
18 Article 17(1) TEU.
19 Article 289(1) TFEU.
20 Article 290(1) TFEU.
21 Sometimes this is referred to as ‘agencification’ in the EU. See, Hofmann, Herwig C.H. and Morini, Alessandro, 
Constitutional Aspects of the Pluralisation of the EU Executive Through ‘Agencification’ (2012). Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2031499
22 Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] EU:C:1982:335, para. 13.
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played a decisive role in protecting the rule of law and fundamental rights in times of crisis, hence 
it is presented in end of the second chapter of the main part, before concluding the thesis.
1.3 Central points of discussion
As mentioned in point 1.1, the financial crisis has affected the EU legal system as a whole. 
This thesis revolves around the changes in the EU legal order brought by the crisis and their effect 
on the present and future functioning of the EU. More particularly, there are two main points
and three additional questions inherent to this thesis. They are going to be discussed in the main 
part and a personal opinion will be given in the conclusion. 
1. The adaptation of the EU regulatory framework on the one hand, and the EU 
institutional architecture on the other, in order to survive the financial crisis and to 
prevent another crisis from occurring. 
This is the first central point that will be omnipresent in this thesis. It encompasses both 
the substantive law reform in the EU and the changes in the institutional structure of the EU, as 
both were needed for a successful recovery. These changes are not temporary and are intended 
to strengthen the EU and make it more resilient to future crises. Because of this, it can be said 
that ‘the institutional and the constitutional balance of the EU has been irreversibly affected, for 
better or for worse.’23
2. The principle of rule of law during and after the crisis.
This is the second central point, which supplements the first. There is a causal link 
between these two points, as the changes in EU law certainly have an impact on the principle of 
rule of law. Ultimately only time will tell if the EU came out stronger from the crisis or if this was
a wasted crisis. Nevertheless, this thesis examines whether those changes in EU law have a 
positive or negative impact on the principle of rule of law presently. Also, the thesis assesses 
what are the long-term and future effects in EU law, caused by such changes.
3. How did the EU institutions cope with the crisis and was their action always justified?
Apart from the substantive and the structural reforms, the EU institutions were and still 
are managing the financial crisis by using their Treaty-given prerogatives. This question 
concentrates on the executive institutions of the EU i.e. the Commission and the ECB. Both 
institutions have tried to alleviate the crisis by adopting measures in their respective field of 
competence. Some of those measures, however, have been criticized by legal practitioners and 
23 U. Neergaard, C. Jacqueson, J. H. Danielsen, J. P. Keppenne, The Economic and Monetary Union: Constitutional 
and Institutional Aspects of the Economic Governance within the EU (The XXVI FIDE Congress in Copenhagen, 2014, 
Vol.1) p. 179.
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scholars and have even upset the Constitutional Courts of some MS. Therefore, any academic 
work regarding the financial crisis cannot bypass examining the EU crisis-management measures.
4. Can the ECB be considered a special institution once again?
The status of the ECB is another point which cannot be avoided. Since the Lisbon Treaty, 
the ECB is officially an institution of the Union.24 However, it is undoubtedly a unique institution, 
as it is distinguished from other institutions by certain characteristics. This was, moreover, 
intensified by the financial crisis. Never before has the ECB been more important than today. 
Because of this, the debate regarding the status of the ECB may be opened once again. In this 
regard, this thesis will present a supported opinion.
5. Has the Court of Justice become more lenient towards the EU institutions, because 
they were ‘saving the Union’?
Exceptional times call for exceptional measures, and such measures are often contested 
before the Court of Justice. In this regard, the Court held that the TFEU established a ‘complete 
system of legal remedies’,25 which means that every natural or legal person concerned with an 
EU measure can have it reviewed. The legal routes for bringing the case before the Court,
however, can be different. Closely linked with this system is Article 19(1) TEU. The text of the said 
Article states ‘the Court ensures that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law 
is observed.’ Thus, this last question incorporates two parts. Firstly, the procedural rules on 
standing and the Court’s interpretation of these rules. These rules are important as they 
determine and limit access to justice. Secondly, the substantive rules and how the Court 
interpreted and applied them in particular cases before it. Basically, how the Court decided in 
the merits of the case, thereby establishing a precedent for future cases. 
1.4 Reservations
The concept of financial crisis is broad and entails many elements which are practically 
impossible to thoroughly examine in one academic writing. This thesis concentrates on the legal 
implications of the financial crisis. The economic aspect of the crisis is briefly considered only as 
supplementary to the legal. Also, as the title suggests, this thesis will only analyse the impact of 
the crisis on the principle of rule of law on European level. The impact on the rule of law on 
national level is not assessed. However, the reactions of the MS to the crisis, which were 
discussed or moreover, adjudicated at Union level, are present in this thesis. Other fields of EU 
law, such as State Aid or the Court’s admissibility rules, are analysed only through the prism of 
the financial crisis and as much as it is required for the purposes of this thesis.
24 Article 13(1) TEU.
25 Case C‑ 274/12 P Telefónica SA v European Commission [2013] EU:C:2013:852, para. 57.
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2. European Central Bank
2.1 Institutional characteristics
The ECB was formally established with the Maastricht Treaty, in Article 4a of the TEC 
Consolidated version 1992.26 However, the ECB and the euro did not just come out of the blue.27
Point 2.3.1 of this thesis deals in detail with the establishment of the EMU. In this part, it suffices 
to say that the creation of a functional ECB was Stage 2 of the EMU. The predecessor of the ECB, 
the European Monetary Institute was created on 1 January 1994 and was a transitional body. The 
purpose of this body was to strengthen and adapt central bank cooperation and make the 
preparations required for the establishment of the ECB.28 The first president of the EMI was Mr. 
Alexandre Lamfalussy, an economist who was part of many important processes within the EMU.
The next president, Mr. Wim Duisenberg was the last president of the EMI and the first president 
of the newly-formed ECB. With the completion of its tasks and as State 2 was coming to an end 
in 1998, the EMI disappeared as a legal entity.29 The physical assets and staff of the EMI moved 
to the ECB and thus, the ECB was fully functional from 1 June 1998.
In addition, a Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB30 was annexed to the 
Maastricht Treaty.31 This Statute regulates the function of the ECB in more detail and has the 
same legal value as the Treaties i.e. it is primary EU law. From then, the ESCB Statute was changed 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam,32 the Treaty of Nice,33 Council Decision 2003/223/EC,34 and the Acts 
of Accession of other MS in the euro area.
For quite some time after its creation, the ECB was not an institution of the Union. The 
mention of the ECB is missing both from Article 4 TEC Consolidated version 1992 and Article 7 
TEC Consolidated versions 1997, 2002 or 2006. Instead, the ECB is mentioned in Article 4a TEC 
1992 and Article 8 TEC 1997 and later versions. This was also the case with the aborted 
Constitutional Treaty,35 which did not mention the ECB as one of the main institutions of the 
26 OJ C 224/5, 31.8.1992, p. 6–79. The European Investment bank was established already with the Treaty of Rome 
Article 129, but amended with the Maastricht Treaty.
27 I. Maes and F. Moss, Progress through crisis? Proceedings of the conference for the 20th anniversary of the 
establishment of the European Monetary Institute (2014) p. 71.
28 Article 109f(2) TEC Consolidated version 1992.
29 Ibid, Article 190l(2).
30 OJ C 326/235, 26.10.2012.
31 Article 106(4) TEC Consolidated version 1992.
32 OJ C 340, 10.11.1997, p.1.
33 OJ C 80, 10.3.2001, p. 1.
34 OJ L 83, 1.4.2003, p. 66.
35 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 310, 16.12.2004, Article I-19.
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Union. This ambiguity and vagueness led to different opinions regarding the status of the ECB. 
Some scholars even considered the ECB to be a ‘special’ institution.36
The Court’s interpretation of the status of the ECB, given in the OLAF case37 in 2003, partly 
settled this uncertainty. Thus, during this pre-Lisbon period the ECB was ‘a body, office or agency 
[which] owes its existence to the EC Treaty’38 and which ‘falls squarely within the Community 
framework’.39 After this ruling, there was not much space left for debate regarding the position 
of the ECB in the framework of the Union. However, the financial crisis, and the role of the ECB 
in it, seems to have opened this debate again. This is analysed in point 2.1.4 of this thesis in detail.
The ECB was expressly mentioned as an institution of the Union by the Treaty of Lisbon, 
in Article 13(1) TEU. Moreover, paragraph 2 of the said Article made the ECB subject to the 
principle of conferral and institutional balance. However, the ECB has two significant 
characteristics, which the other institutions lack. Those are separate legal personality and 
constitutionally-protected independence, which are discussed below. In addition, the democratic 
accountability of the ECB is examined, as it is a complementary concept to its independence. 
These characteristics form the specific status of the ECB, which it is examined at the end.
2.1.1 Legal personality
Firstly, the ECB has separate legal personality, both in the international sphere and in 
relation to the MS or other EU institutions. This is established in Article 282(3) TFEU and Article 
9.1 ESCB Statute. Contrary to this, the other institutions of the Union do not enjoy separate 
personality from the Union. For example, the Commission represents the whole EU, as the Union 
has legal personality accorded by Article 47 TEU. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the 
EIB also has distinct legal personality, by virtue of Article 308 TFEU.
This led some scholars to consider that a separate legal personality is indispensable for 
one banking authority to fulfil its tasks, as central banks need to be able to acquire rights and 
assume obligations themselves. They also need to be able to enter into international treaties. 
Thus, the case of the ECB is nothing out of the ordinary.40 In this regard, Zilioli and Selmayr claim 
that the international legal personality of the ECB, as is normally the case with central banks, is 
derivative, limited and relative.41 The first means that the personality is derived from the State’s 
legal personality and it is limited because it exists only for fulfilment of specific tasks accorded to 
36 T. Tridimas, Community Agencies, Competition Law and ECSB Initiatives on Securities Clearing and Settlement
(2009) Yearbook of European Law Volume 28, p. 216. Also, R. Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary 
Stability (Oxford, 2006) chapter 7.
37 Case OLAF (n 17).
38 Ibid, para. 91.
39 Ibid, para. 92.
40 R. Torrent, Whom is the European Central Bank the central bank of?: Reaction to Zilioli and Selmayr, CMLR 36
(Kluwer Law, 1999) p. 1233.
41 C. Zilioli and M. Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank (Hart Publishing, 2001) p. 180.
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it by the State. Lastly, it is relative since it is conditional on recognition by other subjects of public 
international law. 
However, the same authors claim that this separate legal personality makes the ECB an 
‘organization of Community law’42 which is on equal footing with the EU or Euroatom. Thus, the 
ECB is not within the EU framework,43 as its legal personality goes beyond that of the EIB, which 
is clearly an EU body. This academic debate is the subject matter of part 2.1.3 of this thesis.
On the other hand, neither the ESCB nor the Eurosystem have a legal personality. They
are consisted of 29 and 20 separate legal entities, respectively: the ECB and the NCB, who are 
acting as their ‘agents’. It is interesting to draw a parallel with the US here. The Federal Reserve 
System in the USA, similarly to the ESCB, is not a legal entity. It consisted of Board of Governors
and 12 Federal Reserve Banks, who have legal personality.44 In this regard, the US and the EU 
have a very similar structure of their monetary authorities.
2.1.2 Independence
Secondly, the ECB is independent from other institutions or bodies of the Union and from 
the MS, as stated in Article 130 TFEU,45 as well as Article 7 of the ESCB Statute. The fact that the 
independence of the ECB is protected by the TFEU means that it is of constitutional value and is 
outside of the reach of the EU legislator. This express reference of ECB’s independence in the 
TFEU is a result of the German, or more particularly, ordoliberal influence in the formation of the 
ECB and the ESCB Statute.46 On the other hand, France always advocated a politically 
subordinated ECB.47 The independence of the ECB has three aspects.
Firstly, the ECB enjoys institutional independence. This aspect of the independence 
indicates that the ECB shall not ‘seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices 
or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body.’48 Moreover, 
‘Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and the governments of the Member States shall 
respect that independence’49 by not seeking to influence the ECB in the performance of its tasks. 
Thus, the requirement of institutional independence is symmetrical - it does not only prohibit 
the ECB from taking or seeking instructions, but also requires the authorities of the MS and the 
42 C. Zilioli and M. Selmayr, The constitutional status of the European Central Bank, in CMLR 44, p. 358.
43 Ibid, p. 366.
44 R. Lastra and L. Satragno, The Role of Central Banks in Monetary Affairs: a Comparative Perspective in T. Cottier, 
R. Lastra and C. Tietje (eds), The Rule of Law in Monetary Affairs: World Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press,
2014) p. 93.
45 Interestingly, Article 130 TFEU also protects the independence of the NCB, even though it is uncommon for the 
TFEU to intervene in national legislation.
46 In the 1990s, when the ECB was created, the principle of central bank independence was not yet established. 
Many of the NCB were under the control of the governments. See, V. Berg, The Making of the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks – an Application of Checks and Balances (Rozenberg Publishers, 2005) p. 23-32.
47 Inter alia, Nikolas Sarkozy’s speech “Pour la France du travail” in Agen on 22 June 2006.
48 Article 130 TFEU.
49 Article 282(3) TFEU.
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EU to refrain from seeking to exert influence.50 Moreover, the independence has two aspects –
instrument and goal independence. The former means that the ECB through the ESCB 
independently decides how and through which instruments to implement the monetary policy 
of the Union. The latter refers to the fact that the ECB also defines the monetary policy of the 
Union, in accordance with Article 127(2) TFEU. For example, the ECB does not only maintain price 
stability, but also defines what is price stability - keeping the year-on-year increase in the 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for the euro area of below 2%.51 In this way, the ECB is 
truly independent both from the institutions of the Union and the governments of the MS.
Secondly, the ECB is financially independent, as it has its own budget.52 This means that 
the ECB can finance its activities itself and is not dependant on the EU budget. It is the only 
institution in the Union with its own capital. This financial independence is further protected by 
the prohibition of monetary financing in Articles 123(1) TFEU and Article 21.1 of the ESCB Statute. 
In this regard, the ECB cannot guarantee for the liabilities of the institutions of the EU or the MS, 
for example by purchasing debt instruments, as this can jeopardize the independence of the 
bank. This was the core of the Gauweiler case,53 which will be presented later.
Thirdly, the personal independence of the members of the Executive Board of the ECB is 
protected by several Treaty provisions. To begin with, Article 283(2) TFEU prescribes that the 
members of the Executive Board are selected ‘from among persons of recognised standing and 
professional experience in monetary or banking matters’. Thus, political affiliation cannot be 
considered. The same Article establishes that the term of office is eight years and is not 
renewable.54 Both characteristics are unique. The 8-year mandate is the longest among the EU 
institutions.55 The Commissioner’s56 and members of Parliament57 mandate is five years, and the 
mandate of the Judges of the Court of Justice58 and Members of the Court of Auditors59 is six 
years. This assures that political cycles and changes do not influence the members of the 
Executive Board of the ECB and that they can be consistent with their tasks. On the other hand,
the Board members’ term of office is the only one which is not renewable.60 This means that they 
will not “hope” for renewal of their term of office from the European Council, by conducting 
favourable policies at the end of their mandate. However, Zilioli notes that after their mandate 
50 C. Zilioli, The Independence of the European Central Bank and Its New Banking Supervisory Competences, p.11 in 
Dominique Ritleng, Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the European Union (Oxford, 2016).
51 The definition of price stability - https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/strategy/pricestab/html/index.en.html
(Accessed on 20.5.2017)
52 Article 28 of the ESCB Statute.
53 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler [2015] EU:C:2015:400.
54 Also, confirmed in Article 11.2 ESCB Statute.
55 Not including the members of the European Council and Council of the EU, as they are consisted of 
representatives of the national governments.
56 Article 17(3) TEU.
57 Article 14(3) TEU.
58 Article 253 TFEU.
59 Article 286(2) TFEU.
60 Again, excluding the European Council and Council.
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ends, the Board members would still need support for their next position, thus their 
independence may be jeopardized towards the end of the term. For this purpose, she proposes 
minimum age of appointment.61 Finally, only the Court of Justice can dismiss Board members at 
the request of the Governing Council or the Executive Board and only because of exhaustive 
reasons.62 From this, it is clear that the independence of the ECB is highly valued and protected.
In this regard, it is useful to compare the independence of the ECB with that of the 
Commission, as both are institutions which do not serve national, but instead Union interests.
Article 245 TFEU prohibits the MS from seeking to influence the Commission, however there is 
nothing regarding the influence of other Union institutions. Moreover, the Commission is 
financed by the EU budget and the term of office of the Commissioners is five years and 
renewable. From this, it can be seen that the independence of the ECB was essential for the 
Treaty drafters, who regulated it in detail in the TFEU itself, thereby giving it constitutional 
character.
On the other hand, the level of statutory independence does not always reflect the level 
of actual independence of the central bank.63 Admittedly, a central bank cannot act in isolation 
from other policies. The members of the board of the central bank are necessarily influenced by 
the events in their country. Similarly, members of the ECB Governing Council must at some point 
come in contact with national representatives or representatives of EU institutions. This is even 
more relevant today when the ECB, as will be seen below has different roles within the EU legal 
order. This unavoidably affects the independence of the ECB in practice, as will be seen in the 
next points of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, the independence of the ECB is functional, as held by the Court in the OLAF
case.64 This means that the ECB’s independence is not an end in itself. Instead it is serves the 
purpose of achieving the objectives and fulfilling the tasks assigned to it by the Treaties. The 
abovementioned case concerned the jurisdiction of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) which 
was established by the Commission. The ECB, considering that OLAF would hinder its 
independence, adopted Decision 1999/726/EC which established an internal body responsible 
for combating fraud within the ECB, thereby preventing OLAF from exercising its investigatory 
powers over it. The outcome of the case was the annulment of Decision 1999/726/EC.
The Court began by acknowledging the importance of the ECB’s independence.65
However, in paragraph 135 the Court upheld the claim of the Commission that such 
61 C. Zilioli, Commentary to Article 11 of the Statute, in H. von der Groeben, J. Schwarze and A. Hatje (eds), EUV-
AEUV-Kommentar (7th edn, 2014).
62 Article 11.4 of the ESCB Statute.
63 F. Amtenbrink and J. De Haan, The European Central Bank: An independent specialized organization of 
Community law – A Comment, CMLR 39, p. 72. See also, A. Cuckierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and 
Independence (Cambridge, 1992), p. 369.
64 Case OLAF (n 17).
65 Ibid, para. 130-132.
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independence is strictly functional and is limited to the performance of the specific tasks 
conferred upon the ECB by the TFEU and the ESCB Statute. That paragraph is very significant for 
this part of the thesis, but also relevant for part 2.1.4 of this thesis. Therefore, it is reproduced in 
original:66
“By contrast, as the Commission and the interveners have rightly pointed out, 
recognition that the ECB has such independence does not have the consequence of 
separating it entirely from the [European Union] and exempting it from every rule of 
[Union] law. First, it is evident from Article [127(1) TFEU] that the ECB is to contribute 
to the achievement of the objectives of the [European Union], whilst [Article 13(2) 
TEU] states that the ECB is to act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by 
the [TFEU] and the ESCB Statute. Second, as the Commission has observed, the ECB is, 
on the conditions laid down by the [TFEU] and the ESCB Statute, subject to various 
kinds of [Union] controls, notably review by the Court of Justice and control by the 
Court of Auditors. Finally, it is evident that it was not the intention of the Treaty 
draftsmen to shield the ECB from any kind of legislative action taken by the 
Community legislature, as is clear from, inter alia, Article [127(6) TFEU], Article 
[129(3) and (4) TFEU] and Article [132(1), first indent, and (3) TFEU], which are cited 
by the Commission.”
The independence of the ECB must be seen through the prism of its telos. The ECB is 
independent because it has specific tasks conferred upon it by the Treaties, and the 
independence assures that that those tasks are fulfilled professionally. Therefore, the ECB cannot 
benefit from its independence outside of its tasks and cannot shield itself from any unwanted EU 
control. There is much more to be said regarding the independence of the ECB, however it goes 
outside of the scope of this thesis. 
Independence does not mean isolation from other EU institutions. In this regard, many 
independent bodies are accountable before the public, usually before a representative body of 
the citizens, such as the parliament. As a counterweight to its independence, the democratic 
accountability of the ECB is examined next.
2.1.3 Democratic accountability of the ECB
Because the ECB was created as a hyper-independent central bank with a narrow 
mandate to maintain price stability, democratic accountability was not given particular attention 
at the time of its creation. Also, as stated in the previous point, the ECB has not only instrument, 
but also goal independence. The latter makes it even harder to assess the ECB’s work, since a 
tangible, quantified objective is missing in the Treaties. Instead that objective is set by the ECB 
66 With Lisbon Treaty renumbering and changes in terminology.
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itself. Because of this, the accountability of the ECB plays a subsidiary role in its functioning.67
Nevertheless, this could have been justified when the ECB’s role in the Union was strictly 
technical and confined by the narrow Treaty-given mandate.
However, this changed with time and the need for an accountable ECB increased. Firstly, 
the ECB acquired powers going far beyond its initial narrow mandate and today, as will be seen 
in point 2.3 of this thesis, is one of the most influential institutions in the Union. Having this in 
mind, the principle of rule of law requires that EU institutions are accountable and transparent 
in their work.68 Therefore, a situation where an EU institution receives additional powers while 
the level of accountability of that institution remains the same, undermines the principle of rule 
of law. Secondly, the accountability of the ECB is a source of democratic legitimacy, which the 
ECB clearly lacks. This is because the ECB is a technical institution i.e. an institution consisted of 
experts.69 On the contrary, other EU institutions are consisted either of national representatives
chosen through national election70 or of EU representatives chosen through EU election.71 Either 
way, the involvement of the citizens though elections provides for the democratic legitimacy of 
these institutions.72 In this regard, accountability seen as a dialogue between a technical 
institution such as the ECB and the democratically elected institutions, is the only mechanism for 
ensuring the democratic dimension of the ECB.73 Because of these reasons, the accountability of 
the ECB is more important today than ever before.
The regulation of the ECB’s accountability in primary EU law has remained the same since 
its establishment. Formerly Article 113(3) TEC and now Article 284(3) TFEU require the ECB to 
submit an annual report on the activities of the ESCB to the Parliament, Council, Commission, 
and European Council. Special accent is put on the report before the Parliament and Council, as 
the President of the ECB itself presents that report to them and afterwards a general debate may 
be held on that basis. This Article also provides for the possibility of participation of the President 
of the Council and a Member of the Commission in meetings of the General Council of the ECB. 
In addition, all the members of the ECB Executive Board may be heard by the Parliament, on their 
own initiative or on the request of the Parliament. The ESCB Statute, on the other hand, provides 
for stricter reporting obligations. Apart from the annual report, the ECB is to publish quarterly 
67 F. Amtenbrink, The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks: A Comparative Study of the European Central 
Bank (Hart Publishing, 1999) p. 359.
68 I. Österdahl, Transparency as Part of a European Rule of Law in W. Schroeder (ed.), Strengthening the Rule of 
Law in Europe From a Common Concept to Mechanisms of Implementation (Hart Publishing, 2016), p. 93.
69 See Article 283(2) TFEU. Also, see point 2.1.2 of this thesis regarding their personal independence.
70 See Article 15(2) and 16(2) TEU – members of the European Council and Council of the EU are national 
representatives. See also, Article 17(7) and 19(2) TEU - members of the Commission and the CJEU are not national 
representatives, but are nevertheless proposed by national governments.
71 European Parliament, see Article 14(2) and (3) TEU.
72 Nevertheless, some authors claim that the EU as a whole lacks democratic legitimacy. See inter alia, W. Sadurski,
Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union: A Diagnosis and Some Modest Proposals in Polish Yearbook of 
International Law 32 (2012), p. 21.
73 Chiara Zilioli, The Independence of the European Central Bank and Its New Banking Supervisory Competences, p.
8 in D. Ritleng, Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the European Union (Oxford, 2016).
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reports on the activities of the ESCB74 and a weekly consolidated financial statement of the 
ESCB.75 Furthermore, Article 263 TFEU provides for the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and 
Article 287 TFEU for the jurisdiction of the Court of Auditors, even though the latter’s jurisdiction 
is limited by Article 27 ESCB Statute only to examining the operational efficiency of the 
management of the ECB. In this regard, the ECB considered that there is ‘a well-structured and 
functioning framework for holding the ECB accountable’.76
Regarding the regulation of the ECB’s accountability in secondary EU law, the SSM 
Regulation77 basically brings the supervisory tasks of the ECB within the scope of Article 284 TFEU
and goes even further, as it includes the national parliaments of the euro area MS.78 This
Regulation states that the ECB is to submit to the Parliament, Council, Commission, Eurogroup 
and national parliaments of the euro area MS an annual report on the fulfilment of its supervisory 
tasks.79 Before the Parliament and Eurogroup, this report is presented by the Chair of the ECB 
Supervisory Board. The Chair can also be heard on the execution of its supervisory tasks by the 
Eurogroup. Moreover, the Court of Auditors takes into account the supervisory tasks of the ECB 
when examining the operational efficiency of the management of the ECB. Apart from these 
requirements in law, the ECB has established the practice of publishing the minutes of Governing 
Council meetings since 2015 and holding a monthly press conference with the ECB President and 
the Vice-President.80
This shows that certain steps have been taken for improving the accountability of the ECB, 
even if that was done through secondary EU law or voluntarily by the ECB itself. However, it 
seems that this is not sufficient as there are still concerns about the accountability of the ECB 
after it has received many new powers during the financial crisis. In this regard, Transparency 
International EU states that there is much room for improvement of the accountability and 
transparency of the ECB, especially because the extraordinary crisis measures have stretched ‘the 
ECB’s mandate to breaking point’.81 Moreover, accountability in practise is reduced to
answerability, as the ECB’s independence and broad mandate prevent the other EU institutions, 
including the Court, from effectively overseeing or controlling what the ECB does.82 Particularly 
the participation of the ECB in the ESM, supplemented by the power of the ECB to stall the ELA 
increase, has the consequence of the ECB deciding on the country’s membership in the euro area.
74 Article 15.1 ESCB Statute.
75 Article 15.2 ESCB Statute.
76 ECB Monthly Bulletin November 2002, The Accountability of the ECB
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/mobu/mb200211en.pdf (Accessed on 26.04.2017)
77 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central 
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63.
78 Article 21 SSM Regulation.
79 Article 20(2) and 21(1) SSM Regulation.
80 C. Zilioli, The Independence of the European Central Bank and Its New Banking Supervisory Competences, p. 9 in 
D. Ritleng, Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the European Union (Oxford, 2016).
81 Transparency International EU Report, Two sides of the same coin? Independence and Accountability of the ECB 
(2017), p. 4.
82 Ibid, p. 42-48.
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This is inherently a political decision and needs to be assessed as such, and not as a technocratic 
decision.83
This problem and other problems of insufficient democratic accountability of the ECB are 
assessed in detail in other points of this thesis, especially the point which examines the roles of 
the ECB in the financial crisis. It will be seen that many of the powers of the ECB acquired during 
the crisis, lack not just accountability, but also preciseness and because of this, leave large 
discretion to the ECB. The only possible justification is that the crisis resolution required swift 
action and broader discretion in the hands of the ECB. However, it remains to be seen whether 
these problems will be solved once the crisis is completely over or will the ECB remain a very 
powerful institution with very little accountability and legitimacy.
The institutional characteristics of the ECB presented above show that the ECB is indeed 
a unique EU institution. However, that unique status has often been over- or underestimated by 
academics and in practice. This led to an intense and, at times, personal debate regarding the 
status of the ECB. Consequently, the status of the ECB is analysed next.
2.1.4 The status of the ECB
The legal status of the ECB has been a particularly debated topic between 1999 and 2002, 
with distinguished academics and practitioners having diametrically opposite views. Moreover, 
the debate was not purely academic or terminological, as the ECB itself took a position in the 
debate and acted accordingly in practice. Such debate resulted in many articles being published, 
mostly in Common Market Law Review, and one judgment of the Court of Justice. After the Court 
has given its official view on the status of the ECB, the debate significantly decreased in intensity. 
However, the financial crisis may have opened the debate once again. 
Starting from the establishment of the ECB, there was legal uncertainty regarding its 
status, as it was not defined in the Treaties until the Lisbon Treaty. The roots of this uncertainty 
are to be found even before the creation of the ECB. During the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, 
there were proposals to form another ‘fourth pillar’ for dealing with economic and monetary 
matters, in addition to the three existing pillars.84 In this way, the ECB would have been 
established with a ‘Treaty on EMU’ and would have been far more distinct from the EU than now. 
However, the EMU ended up in the first EC pillar, being regulated in the then newly created TEC 
and only exceptionally in the TEU. This was indeed, the correct choice, as the first pillar was 
governed by the Community integration method85 and was independent from any political 
influence, unlike the other pillars, which is particularly important for the EMU.
83 Ibid, p. 53
84 C. Zilioli and M. Selmayr, The European Central Bank: An Independent Specialized Organization of Community 
Law in CMLR 37, p. 601.
85 P. Craig and G. de Burca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford, 2015) p. 11.
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When the EMU and the ECB were formally created, monetary sovereignty was transferred 
from national to supranational level, perhaps even ‘irrevocably’86 transferred. In this regard, the 
question of the status of the ECB is intrinsically linked with the question of the holder of the 
monetary sovereignty. Some consider that the holder of monetary sovereignty is not the ECB, 
but the Union in the form of the Eurosystem.87 Because of this, the ECB was considered to be ‘an 
independent agency for the performance of monetary policy attributed to the Community level 
of government and for the execution of several other tasks within the overall price-stability 
objective’.88 According to these views, the ECB is fully subordinated to the EU - the conduct of 
monetary policy inherently belongs to the EU, but the EU decided to entrust such task to the ECB. 
This view seems to be extreme, especially today when the ECB is an institution of the Union. Also, 
as Zilioli rightly points out, delegation of powers means that the principal can always revoke the 
delegation and can instruct the agent on the execution of its mandate.89 Clearly, this is not the 
case with the ECB.90 Moreover, the tasks and the powers of the ECB are given by primary EU 
law.91 Having this in mind, it can hardly be maintained that the EU delegated the conduct of 
monetary policy to the ECB.
A more moderate view is given by Torrent who states that the ECB is in no way different 
from other central banks, as many central banks in the world are independent and have legal 
personality, but are nonetheless central banks of the country in question. 92 Moreover, many 
bodies within the EU have legal personality, similarly as the ECB. In this regard, the ECB is, in 
accordance with common sense and legal interpretation, the Central Bank of the EU.93
Contrary to this, the view that the MS transferred their sovereignty in monetary matters 
to the ECB directly, gave rise to the idea that the ECB is a ‘Community within the Community’94
or ‘an independent specialized organization of Community law’95 with Selmayr being the most 
prominent advocate of such ideas.96 These views are based on the specific institutional 
86 This term is used by both the TFEU and the ESCB Statute, see Article 140(3) TFEU and Article 46.3 and 49 ESCB 
Statute.
87 R. Lastra and L. Satragno, The Role of Central Banks in Monetary Affairs: a Comparative Perspective in T. Cottier, 
R. Lastra and C. Tietje (eds), The Rule of Law in Monetary Affairs: World Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press,
2014) p.98.
88 R. Smits, The European Central Bank in the European Constitutional Order (Eleven International Publishing, 2003) 
p. 24.
89 C. Zilioli, The Independence of the European Central Bank and Its New Banking Supervisory Competences, p. 61 
in D. Ritleng, Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the European Union (Oxford, 2016).
90 See point 2.1.2 of this thesis.
91 Article 127 and 282 TFEU. Also, Article 2 and 3 ESCB Statute.
92 R. Torrent, Whom is the European Central Bank the central bank of?: Reaction to Zilioli and Selmayr, in CMLR 36
(Kluwer Law, 1999) p. 1234.
93 Ibid, p. 1231.
94 C. Zilioli and M. Selmayr, The external relations of the euro area: legal aspects in CMLR 36, p. 285.
95 C. Zilioli and M. Selmayr, The European Central Bank: An Independent Specialized Organization of Community 
Law in CMLR 37, p. 621.
96 However, not the only one. See, B. Dutzler, The European System of Central Banks: An Autonomous Actor? The 
Quest for an Institutional Balance of EMU (Springer, 2003), p. 70.
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characteristics of the ECB, presented previously in this thesis. Also, support for such views can be 
found in drawing a parallel with the EIB. The status of EIB has also been subject to debate but to 
a lesser extent than the ECB. In this regard, AG Mancini defined the ECB as ‘a specific and 
autonomous segment of the organizational machinery of the Community’.97 The ECB is also liable
itself for the damage caused in the performance of its duties,98 which is a consequence of its 
financial independence. Previously, Article 288(3) TEC was not precise and could be interpreted 
in such a way that the EU was liable for the damage caused by the ECB. Lastly, the ECB has 
legislative powers. It can adopt regulations necessary for its tasks, decisions and 
recommendations and opinions,99 which is stressed by Selmayr.100
In situations such as this, when there are two extreme positions, the objective reality 
usually is something in between those two positions. This was indeed the case here, as the official 
position of the Court in the OLAF case was that the ECB, even though independent and with 
separate legal personality,101 cannot be separated entirely from the EU.102 Even though the 
attitude of the Court in OLAF was more in favour of those who claim that the ECB is an EU body, 
the Court however, did not expressly state that the ECB is Central Bank of the EU, unlike AG 
Jacobs in the same case.103 Moreover, in another judgment delivered on the same day as OLAF, 
the Court explicitly stated that the EIB is ‘a Community body’,104 a notion which is not used when 
it comes to the ECB in the OLAF case.
Because of this, even after the judgment in OLAF, the academic debate was not settled.
Selmayr continued to claim that the ECB is an ‘independent specialized organization of 
Community law’ and considered the OLAF case to confirm the special status of the ECB.105
Nevertheless, with the Lisbon Treaty the ECB became a Union’s institution, thus it seems that 
Selmayr’s claims of the ECB being an organization can no longer be maintained.
However, as will be seen below, the ECB obtained other roles through the crisis. Because 
of this, it has become one of the most influential EU institutions, which led some practitioners, 
especially German, to consider it ‘too powerful’.106 The financial crisis has undoubtedly 
strengthened the role of the ECB in the EU. Indeed, the actions of the ECB have never before 
97 AG Mancini Opinion in Case 85/86 Commission v Board of Governors of the European Investment Bank [1988] 
EU:C:1988:110, para. 13.
98 Article 340 TFEU and Article 35.3 ESCB Statute.
99 Article 132 TFEU and Article 34.1 ESCB Statute
100 C. Zilioli and M. Selmayr, The European Central Bank: An Independent Specialized Organization of Community 
Law in CMLR 37, p. 620.
101 Case OLAF (n 17), para. 130-132.
102 Ibid, para. 135.
103 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-11/00 Commission v ECB [2002] EU:C:2002:556, para.60.
104 Case 15/00 Commission v. EIB [2003] EU:C:2003:396, para. 75, 98 and 123.
105 C. Zilioli and M. Selmayr, The constitutional status of the European Central Bank, in CMLR 44, p. 365.
106 Isabel Schnabel, member of the German Council of Economic Experts (Five Wise Men), stated the ECB has 
become too powerful http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/05/15/european-central-bank-powerful-admits-
german-economist/ (Accessed on 20.04.2017)
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been so important for the EU. However, the rule of law requires there to be limits to every action
and that every institution, regardless of its status or importance, is constrained by the law. The 
rest of this thesis explores if it is so, in the case of the ECB.
2.2 Internal organisation of the ECB
The ECB is composed of four internal bodies. Those are: the Governing Council, the 
Executive Board, the General Council and the Supervisory board. The last one was established in 
2013, when the ECB received new powers under EU law. Today, the ECB has two mutually 
detached tasks: conducting the monetary policy of the Union107 and prudential supervision over 
significant credit institutions.108 Therefore, the text that follows is divided in two points. 
2.2.1 Internal bodies concerned with monetary policy
The main decision-making body in the ECB is the Governing Council. This body conducts 
the monetary policy of the Union by adopting decisions and guidelines, for example decisions for 
setting interest rates or minimum reserves. It is composed of the six members of the Executive 
Board and the governors of the NCB of the 19 euro area countries,109 who vote according to a 
rotation system. According to this system, the euro area MS are ranked according to the size of 
their economies and financial sector.110 The Governors from countries ranked first to fifth, at the 
time of the writing of this thesis - Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, comprise 
the first group and share four voting rights. The others 14 Governors comprise the second group 
and share 11 voting rights. The monthly rotation is then applied within these two ranked groups 
of MS. The 6 executive members of the Governing Council always have a right to vote. This system 
is very similar to the Federal Reserve in the USA.111 However, the strict voting system is never 
applied in practice. Instead, the decisions of the Governing Council are taken on consensual 
basis.112 The ESCB Statute states that the meetings are confidential, even though they may be 
made public.113 In this regard, the ECB started publishing the minutes of Governing Council 
meetings in 2015 and there is a monthly press conference with the President and the Vice-
President. 
107 Article 282 TFEU. The ECB does this together with the NCB of the MS whose currency is the euro.
108 Article 4 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (SSM Regulation), OJ L 
287/63.
109 Article 10.1 ESCB Statute.
110 Ibid, Article 10.2.
111 The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions (Federal Reserve publications, 2016) p. 13.
112 D.J. Powell, The Trader’s Guide to the Euro Area: Economic Indicators, the ECB and the Euro Crisis Bloomberg 
Publishing, 2013) p. 84.
113 Article 10.4 ESCB Statute.
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The Executive Board manages the day-to-day business of the ECB and implements the 
monetary policy, as defined by the Governing Council. It is composed of President, Vice-President 
and four other members. Regarding the composition of this body, see point 2.1.2 of this thesis.
The General Council is an advisory body, composed of the governors of the NCB of all MS 
and the President and Vice-President of the ECB. The main purpose of this body is to enable the 
MS outside of the euro area to participate in the EMU. This internal body will be dissolved once 
all EU Member States have introduced the single currency.114
2.2.2 Internal bodies concerned with prudential supervision
This part deals only with the characteristics of the Supervisory Board. Many issues in this 
part are further elaborated and supported in the point Supervisory role of the ECB. With the 
adoption of the SSM Regulation in 2013, the ECB was conferred powers in the field of prudential 
supervision of credit institutions. For this reason, a Supervisory Board was established, as an 
internal115 but independent116 body of the ECB. Today the ECB, through the Supervisory Board,
is a central body in the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Apart from establishing the Supervisory 
Board, the SSM Regulation also established substantive prudential rules which are enforced by 
either the Supervisory Board or by the national supervisory authorities. This was intended to be
a permanent solution for ‘the fragmentation of the financial sector’117 which threatened the 
single currency and the internal market. This Board is consisted of Chair, Vice-Chair, four ECB 
representatives and representatives of national supervisors.
However, the ECB through the Supervisory Board supervises only significant credit 
institutions, the significance of a bank being defined by various criteria, most importantly the 
value of the bank’s assets.118 This is a result of a German-French compromise in the drafting of 
the Regulation, with Germany preferring to keep the supervision over its local banks.119 The ECB 
currently supervises 126 credit institutions120 and the total number of credit institutions in the 
euro area is 5002.121 Those 126 banks, however, cover 85% of the total banking assets in the euro 
area.122
114 Article 141(1) TFEU.
115 Article 26(1) SSM Regulation.
116 Ibid, Article 19.
117 Recital 2 SSM Regulation Preamble.
118 Article 6(4) SSM Regulation.
119 J. Schild, Leading together or opposing each other? Germany, France and the European banking union (2015) 
Paper presented for the 14th Biennial Conference of the European Union Studies Association, Boston, p.17.
120 Full list of supervised entities (as of 15 November 2016 - December update), available at 
www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu
121 Number of monetary financial institutions (MFIs) in the euro area: February 2017, available at 
www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu
122 EU regulatory outlook (PricewaterCoopers, 2014) p. 1.
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The adoption of common prudential rules and the creation of a centralised body which 
would apply those rules was an imminent step in the process of harmonisation of the internal 
market for financial services. The SSM undoubtedly reduces the systemic risk and the likelihood 
of bank failure due to reckless investments. However, there are problems with how the decision-
making process is carried out.
Firstly, it is the Governing Council of the ECB which formally adopts the supervisory 
decisions. The Supervisory Board can only propose draft decisions.123 However, supervision is 
supposed to be always separated from monetary policy.124 For this purpose, there are ‘strictly 
separated meetings and agendas’ of the Governing Council125 where supervisory issues are 
discussed. Thus, the Governing Council, the same body with same composition as in monetary 
policy, is to adopt supervisory decisions, setting any monetary policy concern aside when doing 
so. It seems that this concept is impossible to materialize in practice.
Secondly, the Governing Council of the ECB adopts the supervisory decisions by applying 
‘reverse majority voting’126 - the decision is adopted as long as the Governing Council does not 
object to its adoption by simple majority.127 In practice this means that many decisions proposed 
by the Supervisory Board will be “rubber stamped” by the Governing Council, since there is no 
formal voting requirement for their adoption.  Such a procedure of tacit approval is clearly at 
odds with Article 10.2 ESCB Statute, which states that ‘save as otherwise provided for in this 
Statute, the Governing Council shall act by simple majority of the members having a voting right’. 
The ESCB Statute does not provide for exemptions regarding the adoption of supervisory 
decisions. This makes the SSM Regulation, as secondary EU law, in contradiction with an act of 
primary EU law. Thus, the principle of rule of law, which requires every act to be based in law and 
in accordance with the higher legal norms, is undermined.
Thirdly, the Supervisory Board as an integral part of the ECB and national supervisory 
authorities comprise the Single Supervisory Mechanism. As mentioned previously, whether one 
national bank is supervised by the ECB on European level or by the national supervisor on national 
level depends on the ‘significance’ of that bank. Nevertheless, there must be no difference in the 
treatment of banks, irrelevant of the level on which they are supervised. Contrary to this, the 
functioning of the SSM in practise has shown that there is indeed a difference in treatment
between banks supervised on national level and those supervised on European level.128 In 
addition to this, there is an increased risk of fragmentation of the financial market between the 
banks in- and outside of the euro area.129
123 Article 26(8) SSM Regulation.
124 Ibid, Article 25.
125 Ibid, Article 25(4).
126 Paul Weismann, European Agencies and Risk Governance in EU Financial Market Law (Routledge 2016), p. 197.
127 Article 26(8) SSM Regulation.
128 For a detailed analysis of this problem, see p. 32 of this thesis.
129 R. M. Lastra, Banking Union and Single Market in Fordham International Law Journal 36 (2013), p. 1190–1224.
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For these reasons, even though the SSM was required both for further integration and for 
more stable internal market, the way in it materialized in practise is arguable. Some of those 
problems are of constitutional nature, which makes them particularly alarming. For now, it 
remains to be seen whether the question on the validity of individual decisions of the ECB, acting 
on behalf of the SSM, is going to arise before the Court of Justice, so there would be an official 
position on these issues.
2.3 Role of the ECB in the financial crisis
The ECB has been and still is a central actor in the financial crisis and its resolution. It has 
been involved, directly or indirectly, in all the steps taken to counter the crisis – crisis 
management, substantive law reform and structural changes in the EU. Moreover, the ECB is not 
only important for the resolution of the present crisis, but also for preventing any possible future 
crises of this kind. This is because, during the crisis years, the ECB has received permanent powers 
and responsibilities which aim at making it capable of tackling any problem at an early stage, 
before it turns into a EU-wide crisis.
The ECB’s contribution to the resolution of the crisis is undeniable. Nevertheless, that 
does not make it unquestionable. Indeed, the ECB may have played a more important role in the 
financial crisis than the Treaties allow, thereby undermining the principle of rule of law. Many of 
its actions were contested before the Court. Also, many scholars and academics criticised its 
actions both from legal and economic perspective. On the other hand, the ECB seemed to be 
concentrated only on ‘saving the euro’130 and convinced that its policies would bring prosperity 
and growth once again. If anything, the ECB was always consistent in its actions and left nothing 
to chance. Due to the importance of the actions of the ECB and the vagueness of its policies, this 
part is divided in four points - the first and the last focus on the monetary role of the ECB, and 
two in between them focus on the supervisory role and the broader, economic role. 
2.3.1 Monetary role of the ECB before Gauweiler
With the creation of the EMU, there was a need for a centralized body, which would 
define and implement the monetary policy of the Union. Such task was given to the ECB with its 
creation. However, the ECB, together with the EMU, has evolved throughout the years. It been 
assigned new roles, but also its old role in monetary policy has changed. Because of this, the 
monetary role of the ECB for the purposes of this thesis is divided in two sections, the split point 
being the ground-breaking and highly-criticized Gauweiler case.131 Since the tasks of the ECB are 
130 Speech by Jörg Asmussen, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, The Economist’s Bellwether Europe 
Summit, London, 25 April 2013 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130425.en.html
(Accessed on 20.04.2017)
131 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler [2015] EU:C:2015:400.
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dependant of the constellation of the EMU, this section begins with a presentation on the 
creation of the EMU.
After a failed attempt by the Werner Report,132 political will for the creation of the EMU 
was clearly expressed in the preamble of the Single European Act.133 However there were two 
different views as to how the EMU should be created, known as ‘monetarist’ and ‘economist’ 
view.134 The monetarist view supported the idea of monetary union as a starting point of a fully 
integrated EMU – a single currency and common monetary policy would facilitate and lead to the 
further political and economic integration. On the other hand, the economist view advocated the 
creation of a political and economic union as a precondition for a single currency – they claimed 
that only in this way the stability of the single currency would be guaranteed.135 In order to settle 
this debate and to offer an expert opinion on how the EMU should be created, a special 
committee was established, chaired by Mr. Jacques Delors - the former President of the 
Commission. The product of the work of this committee was a report, known as the Delors 
Report.136 In point 18 of this Report, the need to Treaty change, which would provide for the legal 
basis for EMU, is stressed. In its next point, the monetarist view is essentially endorsed. It 
suggested for the creation of the EMU to be carried out in three stages. 137 These suggestions 
were accepted and expressed in the Maastricht Treaty, which provided for the legal basis for the 
EMU.138 The first stage was closely related to the completion of the internal market and the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism which were the preconditions for the creation of the EMU.
This was achieved with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which provided for the second stage
to begin in 1994. The design of the EMU, created in Stage 2, was based on a division of 
competences between the economic and monetary policies, which is largely the case today – in 
accordance with the monetarist views. However, economist views were also present, as the 
Maastricht Treaty provided for convergence criteria to be fulfilled in order for a MS to be part of 
the EMU139 – hence there was some form of economic harmony within the common currency 
area. The main challenge in Stage 2 was the creation of the EMI and the ECB, which were
predominantly influenced by the German ordoliberal thought. The main ideas of the Freiburg 
school were independent central bank, which was governed by experts and had a narrow 
132 Report to the Council and the Commission on the realization by stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the 
Community, Luxembourg 8 October 1970.
133 See preamble of the Single European Act OJ L 169/1 29.06.1987.
134 J. Pissani-Ferry, Only One Bed for Two Dreams: A Critical Retrospective on the Debate over the Economic 
Governance of the Euro Area (2006) JCMS Volume 44, p. 824.
135 K. Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge, 2015) p. 184.
136 Report on economic and monetary union in the European Community by the Committee for the study of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EC Commission, 1988).
137 F. Snyder, EMU Revisited: Are We Making a Constitution? What Constitution Are we Making, in P. Craig and G. 
de Burca, The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, 1999) p.421-424.
138 Article 2 TEC Consolidated version 1992.
139 Articles 109j and 109k TEC Consolidated version 1992. See also, Protocol on the convergence criteria referred to 
in Article 109j of the Treaty establishing the European Community. MS not fulfilling these criteria are regarded as 
‘Member States with a derogation’.
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mandate to preserve price stability. The Bundesbank itself owes its success to the application of 
these ideas. This was also applied to the ECB and enshrined in the Treaties and the ESCB Statute. 
In this regard, point 2.1.2 is dedicated to the independence and point 2.2 with the expert 
governance of the ECB. Because of these characteristics, the ECB was given a narrow mandate of 
preserving the price stability which is today expressly stated in Article 127 TFEU.140 Stage 3 of 
EMU began in 1999, as suggested by the Delors Report and finalized the EMU, as the MS who 
met the criteria became formally part of the euro area. Stage 3 was mostly concerned with 
supervising how the MS and the EU implemented the novelties from Stage 2, for example 
whether MS made their NCB independent and how the newly-created ECB functions and 
prepares for the first issue of the euro banknotes.
Nevertheless, the EMU was not permanently fixed with the end of Stage 3. Changes in the 
EMU and in the functioning of the ECB followed even after all the stages were completed. 
However, one thing remained unchanged - the ECB from its establishment until today is the main 
actor in the Union’s monetary policy, as it is the only body in the Union which can set the key 
interest rate141 and can issue euro banknotes.142 These prerogatives enable the ECB to define and 
implement the monetary policy. On the other hand, the NCB are acting as agents, as they 
implement on national level the monetary policy as defined by the ECB, and the ECB for this 
purpose can give instructions to the NCB.143 Thus, the ECB and the NCB are in a vertical position, 
where the ECB is the central bank of the Union and the NCB are its agents when they implement 
the Union’s monetary policy.144 However, when performing tasks unrelated to the ESCB, they are 
acting as independent national agencies.145 Therefore, with the creation of the EMU the NCB of 
the MS of the euro area gained a ‘dual nature’.146
As mentioned previously, not all the MS are part of the euro area. Clearly, they conduct 
their own national monetary policy and the ECB decisions of the ECB concerning the common 
monetary policy are not legally binding for them.147 Still, those MS need to cooperate with the 
ECB and treat its exchange-rate policy as a matter of common Union interest148 and ideally, aim 
to reach the convergence criteria for entering the EMU.149 Also, the MS outside of the EMU are 
part of the General Council of the ECB.150
140 K. R. McNamara, The Forgotten Problem of Embeddedness p. 24, in M. Matthijs and M. Blyth, The Future of the 
Euro (Oxford, 2015).
141 Article 12 ESCB Statute.
142Article 128 TFEU and Article 16 ESCB Statute.
143 Article 12.1 ESCB Statute.
144 Ibid, Article 14.3.
145 Ibid, Article 14.4.
146 B. Scouteris, P. Athanassiou, National Central Bank Tasks and the Boundaries of the ECB Governing Council’s 
Powers under Article 14.4 Of the Statute: State of Play and Future Prospects (2015) SSRN Research Paper, p. 9.
147 Article 139 TFEU.
148 Ibid, Article 142.
149 Ibid, Article 140.
150 See point 2.2.1 of this thesis, Internal bodies concerned with monetary policy.
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The primary objective of preserving price stability was particularly important in times of 
financial crisis. The ECB has successfully held the rate of inflation at a low level during the crisis, 
being above 2% only in 2011 and 2012 and the highest being 3.3% in 2008. On the other hand, 
deflation is also not desired,151 which seems to be a bigger problem today than inflation, as the 
EU economy is stabilizing, but there is no growth as the inflation rate in 2015 and 2016 was 0.0 
and 0.2, respectively.152 This task of the ECB is even more complicated, considering the fact that 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy may be defective, as national banks may react 
belatedly or not react at all to the official interest rate set by the ECB. Thus, a central bank, 
especially a supranational one like the ECB, can never be sure when and what effect its decision 
will have on national level in times of crisis. In this regard, the task of maintaining price stability
was substantially facilitated and simplified, as it is also a prudential supervisor and plays a role in 
the economic policy, as will be seen in the next point of this thesis. Hence, the ECB was able itself 
to remove any obstacles which cause trouble in the transmission mechanism. However, it is 
questionable whether such concentration of powers poses a threat to the principle of rule of law.
2.3.2 Supervisory role of the ECB
The possibility of prudential supervision being conferred upon the ECB is established in 
Article 127(6) TFEU, which was added with the Lisbon Treaty amendments. However, it was not 
until the adoption of the SSM Regulation in 2013 that the ECB was empowered in the field of 
prudential supervision. It is rather uncommon for preventive measures, like prudential 
supervision, to be taken in mid-crisis period, because in those times the MS react protectively, 
reverting to basic ideas of sovereignty.153 However, the case of prudential supervision is specific 
because it is part of the broader process of financial market integration.
The integration process in the internal market for financial services began soon after the 
creation of the EMU. This is logical, since with the creation of the euro as common currency, the 
functioning of national commercial banks became common concern of the euro area. In this 
regard, in the USA there is a Division of Banking Supervision within the Federal Reserve System,
which supervises individual banks on a central level.154 Therefore, the process of integration of 
the financial sector in the EU started as early as 2001, and was known as the Lamfalussy process. 
The Lamfalussy committee and its report are relevant for the establishment of many financial 
committees and authorities, thus they are presented in part 3.2 of this thesis. For this part, it is 
important that this committee stressed the need for strengthening the cooperation of national 
151 H. K. Scheller, The European Central Bank - History, Role and Functions (2004) ECB Publication, p. 46.
152 Eurostat, HICP - inflation rate, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00118 (Accessed on 
20.04.2017)
153 T. Tridimas, Federalization, crisis management, and law reform, in P. Craig, The Evolution of EU Law (2011) p.
796.
154F. S. Mishkin, Synergies between Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy in Prudential Supervision: What Works 
and What Doesn't (University of Chicago Press, 2001) p. 275.
E u r o p e a n  C e n t r a l  B a n k | 25
supervisors on EU level, regarding macro and micro prudential supervision.155 As shall be seen 
below, the EU endorsed the proposals in the Lamfalussy report and implemented them in 
practice. However, as time passed and the economic circumstances worsened, mere cooperation
between national supervisors proved to be insufficient. Thus, further integration was required.
The legal basis for such deeper integration was given in the Lisbon Treaty. The first 
financial difficulties, which were the precursors of the crisis, were felt in 2008. Because of this, 
even before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Barroso Commission started making 
plans on how to implement its provisions. The main focus was on dealing with the ‘obvious 
mismatch between European and global financial markets and supervision which remains largely 
national’.156 Since there was political will for financial integration, it remained for concrete 
proposals to be made. For this reason, a High Level Expert Group on EU financial supervision was 
set up by the Commission. Due to its chair, this group is known as the de Larosière group. Its task 
was to give expert opinion and recommendations on how to strengthen the European 
supervisory arrangements. This task is clearly similar to the one of the Lamfalussy committee. 
However, there is one fundamental difference - the Lamfalussy committee was requested in 
order to complete the integration of the financial market, unlike the de Larosière group was the 
result of the global financial crisis, which was expected to strike Europe very soon. The product
of the Group’s work was the Report of the de Larosière group issued in February 2009. There 
were two main recommendations: reform in the macro-prudential supervision157 and reform in 
the micro-prudential supervision158. Both are highly relevant for this thesis and are therefore 
discussed in separate parts, concentrating on what was recommended by de Larosière group and 
what was implemented by the EU. Unlike the changes in macro-prudential supervision, the 
changes in micro-prudential supervision have attracted quite criticism. Due to this, part on micro-
prudential supervision is considerably longer.
A) Macro-prudential supervision
Macro-prudential supervision is aimed at limiting the distress of the financial system as a 
whole, which is caused not by an individual bank but by the flaws of the financial system. Such 
flaws, if not addressed at an early stage, can be detrimental. Central banks are in the best position 
for macro supervision, as they have all the relevant data: inflation, credit expansion, interest 
rates, etc. Macro prudential supervision identifies any imbalance and acts accordingly, or if it is 
outside of its competences, issues an early warning to the competent authorities. This type of 
supervision particularly has been a problem in the EU.159
For this reason, the de Larosière Report, in its Recommendation 16, proposed the 
establishment of a European Systemic Risk Council, as a European body entrusted with carrying 
155 Lamfalussy Report, p. 17.
156 European Commission Press Release IP/08/1679, Brussels, 11.11.2008.
157 De Larosière Report p. 44.
158 Ibid, p. 46.
159 Ibid, p. 39.
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out macro prudential supervision on EU level. In this regard, the European Systemic Risk Board 
was created in 2010.160 Also, the Chair of this Board is the President of the ECB,161 which ensures 
the involvement of the ECB in this process. National central banks are also involved162 and the 
cooperation and exchange of information between the Board, national and European supervisory 
authorities is expressly mentioned.163 Thus, the legislator recognised the link between different 
types of supervision. Moreover, this Board has the power to issue warnings and 
recommendations for remedial actions, such as legislative initiatives164 which is in accordance 
with the Report. A good example of the work of the Board is given in its report ‘Is Europe 
Overbanked?’. Through this report, the ESRB firstly establishes the problem of bank expansion in 
Europe, then it determines the causes of the problem and in the end, offers solutions to it. Thus, 
the macroeconomic proposals in the de Larosière Report were fully acknowledged and entirely 
implemented in practice.
On the other hand, the ESRB is composed of many members – representatives of ECB, 
NCB, Commission, European Supervisory Authorities and Committees. Hence, its functioning may 
be difficult and its decisions may be largely a result of a compromise. Also, the impact of the ESRB 
has not been particularly evident, since it only received advisory and not regulatory powers. The 
body relies mostly on its expertise and reputation in order to influence national and European 
policies. 
Nevertheless, with the creation of the ESRB, the ECB undoubtedly received an extended 
role in the field of macro-prudential supervision. The ECB is the main actor within the ESRB, as 
the president of the ECB chairs the ESRB but furthermore, because the ECB can influence NCB as 
part of the ESCB when pursuing its policies within the ESRB. As stated above, the ECB has the 
most relevant monetary data in order to assess the situation. On the other hand, the involvement 
of the NCB, the Commission and micro-prudential authorities within the ESRB constrains the ECB 
and ensures that the most appropriate action will be taken. All of this is supported by the de 
Larosière Report, which perhaps is the reason for the lack of criticism from legal practitioners and 
academics regarding this extended macro-economic role of the ECB. The ESRB by fulfilling its 
tasks makes another crisis less probable and, at the same time accelerates the way out of the 
current crisis.
B) Micro-prudential supervision
Micro-prudential supervision is aimed at preventing individual banks from taking up risky 
investments or carrying out any unsound action. It is a fact that banks, driven by profit motives, 
160 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on 
European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk 
Board, OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1–11.
161 Ibid, Article 5.
162 Ibid, Article 6.
163 Ibid, Article 15.
164 Ibid, Article 16.
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may pursue dangerous policies and end up failing, thereby endangering the whole financial 
system. Because of this, banks and their functioning are regulated by rules, the compliance of 
which is overseen by an official authority.
The de Larosière Report recognised the importance of micro prudential supervision in the 
EU and moreover that the mechanisms existing at that time were insufficient. In this regard, it 
proposed the creation of a European System of Financial Supervision – a decentralised network 
of three new European Authorities with enhanced supervisory powers, replacing the than-
existing committees. Such powers include increased coordination of national supervisors, taking 
part in on-site inspections carried out by national supervisors, adopting standards and legally 
binding interpretation of financial rules, binding mediation decisions for solving disputes 
between national supervisors, etc.165 It also proposed colleges of supervisors within this network, 
which would supervise all major cross-border credit institutions.166 Nevertheless, day-to-day 
supervision should remain on national level, as national supervisors are closest to the markets 
and credit institutions under supervision.
On the other hand, the de Larosière Report expressly states that the Group does not 
support any role whatsoever for the ECB in the field of micro-prudential supervision.167
Conferring on the ECB such powers would have several negative implications for the ECB itself 
and for the Union. Firstly, the primary objective of the ECB as part of the ESCB is to maintain price 
stability. Giving the ECB the task of supervising banks directly could impinge on this fundamental 
objective – the focus of the ECB would be shared between the monetary and supervisory 
objective which is contrary to the intention of the creators of the ECB.168 Secondly, the ESCB/ECB 
does not have competences outside of the euro area and the ECB would not be able to supervise 
banks in those MS. Thus, the ECB as supervisor could not establish an integrated system of 
supervision within the EU. Thirdly, the members of the ECB may not have the required expertise 
for supervisory matters. Lastly and most importantly, the ECB in times of crisis would have to 
interact with the ministers of finance or other competent authorities of the MS, as supervisors 
are necessarily involved in the process of providing financial support. Such a process is highly-
politicized and involves dealing with tax-payers money and/or structural reforms in the economy 
of the MS. This in turn increases peer pressure on the participants in the process, which could
significantly undermine the constitutionally-protected independence of the ECB. Today this is
indeed the case, as shall be seen below, because the ECB is one of the main actors within another 
international organization, the ESM. 
The main opponent and critic of conferring the ECB supervisory powers is Germany. 
During the planning of the SSM, German Chancellor Angela Merkel questioned the capacity of 
165 De Larosière Report, p.52.
166Ibid, p.48.
167 Ibid, p.43.
168 See part 2.3.1 of this thesis, Monetary role of the ECB.
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the ECB to supervise banks in the EU.169 However, Germany is one of the few MS whose national 
supervisory authority is legally and technically subject to the Finance ministry.170 Taking this into 
consideration, the motives of such German resistance become obvious.
Nevertheless, conferring supervisory powers to body, office or agency of the EU, as 
suggested by Germany and the de Larosière Report may be in contradiction with the Meroni171
doctrine. Prudential supervision necessarily entails a certain amount of discretion which makes 
it problematic for being conferred on a EU body not expressly mentioned in the Treaties. In this 
regard, assigning the ECB as prudential supervisor is preferred. 
In addition, it is worth mentioning that there is academic literature that supports the 
juncture of monetary and supervisory functions in the hands of central banks.172 Also, several 
national central banks, inter alia, Nederlandsche Bank173 and Bank of France174, are responsible 
for supervision, in addition to conducting monetary policy. In this regard, the benefit of vesting 
both powers in the ECB would be access to better information and better crisis resolution. Since 
the ECB is de facto lender-of-last resort, being able to judge the credit worthiness of the bank in 
question would help it assess the situation better.175 Moreover, it could conduct the monetary 
policy better, as it could remove itself the obstacles in the monetary transmission mechanism 
caused by individual banks, by using its supervisory powers.176 This is even more true in times of 
crisis, when flawed and/or aggressive individual banks can weaken the transmission mechanism, 
by not reacting properly to the official interest rate set by the ECB. Nevertheless, even though 
the ECB may benefit from being the main actor in both monetary policy and prudential 
supervision in times of crisis, its independence could suffer in the long term.
Taking all these issues and arguments into consideration, the EU legislator in 2013 in 
accordance with the special legislative procedure adopted the SSM Regulation, thereby 
conferring micro-supervisory tasks to the ECB. Nevertheless, the de Larosière-suggested 
European Supervisory Authorities were also created, but with significantly smaller micro-
supervisory role than the ECB. They will be examined in part 3.2 of this thesis. The purpose of the 
SSM and the ECB as central to it, is to ensure the safety and soundness of credit institutions which 
169 http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/politics/3588-rehn-schedule-for-single-supervisory-
mechanism-feasible.html (Accessed on 20.5.2017).
170 Chiara Zilioli, The Independence of the European Central Bank and Its New Banking Supervisory Competences, 
p.32 in Dominique Ritleng, Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the European Union (Oxford, 
2016).
171 Case 9/56 Meroni [1958] EU:C:1958:7, p. 140.
172 P. Schioppa, EMU and Banking Supervision in C. Goodhart (ed.), Which Lender of Last Resort for Europe? (2000), 
p.15-29.
173 F. Amtenbrink, The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks: A Comparative Study of the European Central 
Bank (Hart Publishing, 1999) p. 100.
174 Ordonnance no 2010-76 du 21 janvier 2010 portant fusion des autorités d'agrément et de contrôle de la banque 
et de l'assurance, JORF no 18 du 22 janvier 2010, p. 1392, NOR ECEX0929065R.
175 T. Beck and D. Gross, Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision: Coordination instead of separation (Centre for 
European Policy Studies, 2012) p. 5-6.
176 ECB Monthly Bulletin July 2000, Monetary policy transmission in the euro area, p. 50
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are essential for the stability of the financial system of the Union.177 Therefore, the SSM is there 
to prevent bank failure from occurring at the first place, by overseeing the banks’ compliance 
with prudential rules, inter alia, capital requirements or ‘fit and proper’ manager requirements. 
If a bank is in breach of such rules there are penalties178 and other supervisory powers,179 which 
can be used against it. 
The creation of the SSM was justified and in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality.180 First, the two main reasons of bank failure are inadequate corporate 
governance and weak risk management.181 Crucial for both is a strong and independent 
supervisory authority, which would sanction every breach of the prudential rules. However, 
different MS had different prudential rules and banks established themselves, according to the 
freedom of establishment, in those MS with the most lenient rules. This led to a ‘regulatory race 
to the bottom’, with MS adopting lower standards to attract banks. Basically, the MS with the 
lowest prudential standard in the EU was setting the EU-wide standard. With the adoption of the 
SSM Regulation such practises are eliminated, as now there is one prudential standard which 
applies throughout the whole EU. Moreover, large banks, whose stability is crucial for the overall 
financial are supervised directly by the ECB.
Second, after the creation of the common monetary policy and currency, the prevention 
of bank failure is not only a national concern, but a common concern of the whole euro area. 
National commercial banks are part of the European EMU and are interconnected with banks in 
other MS. Those banks are, moreover, an essential source of funding for businesses that are 
active throughout the EU internal market. Therefore, when one bank fails, it has repercussions 
in other sectors of the economy, which in turn affects the overall financial stability of the EU. The 
Court has recognised this phenomenon in the Kotnik182 case, as a ‘negative spill-over effect’, and 
later used it in its reasoning in other cases.183
It is important to note that the SSM Regulation created a novel situation in EU law – the 
ECB, an EU institution, can apply provisions of national law and can base its supervisory decisions 
on such provisions.184 This is because of the following. Many of the powers of the ECB given in 
the SSM Regulation are broad and for that reason, conditional on a directive, which defines those 
powers more precisely.185 However, an EU directive must be transposed in the legal system of 
the MS is order to be given full effect. An EU directive can only in exceptional cases be relied on
177 Recital 30 SSM Regulation Preamble.
178 Article 18 SSM Regulation.
179 Ibid, Article 16.
180 Article 5 TEU.
181 S. V. Ragalevsky and S. J. Ricardi, Anatomy of a bank failure (2009) 126 Banking Law Journal, p. 869.
182 Case C‑ 526/14 Kotnik [2016] EU:C:2016:570, para. 50.
183 Joined Cases C‑ 8/15 P to C‑ 10/15 P Ledra Advertising v Commission and ECB [2016] EU:C:2016:701, para 72.
184 Article 4(3) SSM Regulation.
185 The reason for regulating this field of law through directives is that the MS could not reach a consensus in the 
Council regarding the standards of supervision. Thus, many prudential requirements were left to the discretion of 
the MS.
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directly,186 such as against the state,187 an emanation of state,188 in conjunction with general 
principles of EU law,189 etc. Thus, for unobstructed fulfilment of its day-to-day supervisory tasks, 
the ECB needed to be able to rely on national law transposing relevant directives. That national 
law precisely defines the circumstances under which the ECB can act.
Because of the uniqueness of the situation where an EU institution bases its actions on 
national law, there is are some questions that arise. Firstly, what would happen if the MS failed 
to transpose the directive after the time-limit for implementation has passed? The ECB could 
benefit from the Viamex190 case, which established that the provisions of that directive may be 
applicable when provisions of a regulation are conditional on compliance with that directive. 
Since many of the powers of the ECB are indeed conditional on directives, the ECB could rely on 
those directives directly. On the other hand, the principles of rule of law and legal certainty may 
prevent the ECB from acting in such a case, thereby preventing the ECB from supervising banks 
in MS which have not transposed the relevant directives. This second outcome seems more
reasonable as the SSM Regulation states that the ECB can apply either the provisions of a
regulation or the provisions of national law transposing relevant directives i.e. it cannot apply a 
directive directly. Moreover, the principle of legal certainty requires that private parties are able 
to ‘ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are’,191 which seems troublesome 
when such rights and obligations are given in a non-transposed EU directive. Therefore, when 
there is no transposing national law, the ECB will most likely be precluded from acting.
Secondly, does the Court retain exclusive jurisdiction over acts of the ECB based purely 
on national law, or do national courts have a role to play also? The Court held in Foto-Frost192
that it has sole jurisdiction over acts of EU institution, and subsequent cases193 proved that the 
Court is not willing to allow national courts to rule on the validity of EU measures, since that 
would undermine the effectiveness of EU law. Moreover, the exclusive competence of the CJEU 
to review acts of the ECB is confirmed in the ESCB Statute194 and SSM Regulation.195 However, 
the Court does not have jurisdiction to review national law under Article 263 TFEU,196 and a 
186 P. Craig and G. de Burca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford, 2015) p.220-224.
187 Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] EU:C:1986:84, para. 35.
188 Case C-188/89 Foster [1990] EU:C:1990:313, para. 22.
189 Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] EU:C:2005:709, paras. 76-77. Also, Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2007] 
EU:C:2010:21, para. 56.
190 Joined Cases C-37 and 58/06 Viamex [2008] EU:C:2008:18, para. 28.
191 Case C‑ 345/06 Heinrich [2009] EU:C:2009:140, para. 44.
192 Case C-314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] EU:C:1987:452, paras. 15-17.
193 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] EU:C:2002:462, para. 40; Case C-362/14 Schrems [2015] 
EU:C:2015:650, para. 61; Case C-370/12 Pringle [2012] EU:C:2012:756, para. 39. See also, M. P. Maduro, L. Azoulai, 
The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty’(Hart 
Publishing, 2010), p. 194.
194 Article 35.1 ESCB Statute.
195 Recital 60 SSM Regulation Preamble.
196 Case C-50/00 P UPA [2002] EU:C:2002:462, para. 43; C-263/02 P Commission v Jégo-Quéré [2004] 
EU:C:2004:210, para. 33; Case C-64/05 P Sweden v Commission [2007] EU:C:2007:802, para. 91; Case C-562/12 
Liivimaa Lihaveis MTÜ [2014] EU:C:2014:2229, para. 48
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decision based on national law might as well be considered an act of national law in its substance.
Thus, there may be a claim that national courts, and not the CJEU, are competent in such a case.
Moreover, the SSM Regulation does not expressly state that only the CJEU has jurisdiction to 
review ECB decisions based on national law. It only timidly mentions Article 263 TFEU without 
further elaboration, in one recital of the preamble. On the other hand, the Article 13(2) SSM 
Regulation clearly confirms the sole jurisdiction of the Court to review the lawfulness of the ECB 
supervisory decisions regarding on-site inspections. Presumably, such a confirmation of the 
CJEU’s jurisdiction over ECB decisions based on national law is missing, because the EU legislator 
itself was uncertain regarding it. Nevertheless, it appears more likely for the Court to look at the 
institutional nature of the decision i.e. who adopted the decision, instead of looking at the law 
applied therein, and eventually to decide that it has exclusive jurisdiction to review an ECB 
decision based purely on national law, under Article 263 TFEU.
These questions will unavoidably come before the Court at a certain point in time. It 
remains to be seen whether the Court through its case-law, will grant even broader discretion to 
the ECB in the field of prudential supervision, so it can fulfil its tasks without obstructions from 
the MS. However, aside from such compelling questions, there are unfortunately real difficulties 
in the way the SSM functions. Here a reference is made to the problems stated at page 21 of this 
thesis. This part builds on those problems.
Firstly, the ECB may have a conflict of interests. As responsible for both monetary policy 
and prudential supervision, the ECB could be inclined to use its supervisory powers to achieve 
monetary objectives, and vice versa. For example, the ECB may require banks to reduce the risk 
of their activities or to impose liquidity requirements197 in order to allegedly protect the 
soundness of the banks in question. However, the real purpose behind such measure could be to 
reduce inflation, which is a monetary policy objective. This constitutes misuse of powers: a 
measure has been ‘taken with the exclusive purpose, or at any rate the main purpose, of 
achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the 
Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case’.198 This is one of the grounds for review 
and annulment under Article 263 TFEU, however a claim of misuse of powers is rarely accepted 
by the Court. Misuse of powers requires the subjective intention or even the ‘moral obligation’199
of the institution in question to be ascertained, which is particularly troublesome for the 
applicant to prove in court proceedings. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a measure of the ECB, 
as the one mentioned in the example above, is going to be annulled on the basis of misuse of 
powers, even if in reality it is so. In practice, the ECB has at its disposal both monetary instruments 
and supervisory powers when pursuing certain objective and, even though this is prohibited 
under the Treaties, the ECB can go unsanctioned by the Court.
197 These supervisory powers are given in Article 16(2) SSM Regulation.
198 Case C-331/88 FEDESA [1990] EU:C:1990:391, para 24; Case C-146/13 Spain v Parliament and Council [2015] 
EU:C:2015:298, para. 56.
199 Case 105/75 Giuffrida [1976] EU:C:1976:128, para. 17.
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This next point is related to the first. It is very hard to isolate prudential supervision from 
monetary policy when both are vested in the same body. However, such separation is expressly 
referred to multiple times in the SSM Regulation.200 It seems that the EU legislator was trying to 
reconcile the de Larosière recommendation of separate European supervisor with the views of 
some MS to give supervisory tasks to the ECB. As seen above, the end-result was an internal but 
detached body of the ECB. This endangers the independence of the ECB in conducting monetary, 
as supervisory tasks are necessarily more ‘politicized’.201 This is because supervision is crucial for 
placing an entity under resolution, and resolution can in turn lead to bail-in with private funds 
and ultimately, bail-out with public funds. This means that the ECB supervisory decisions have 
long-term effects on the economy of the MS in question and because of this the ECB may need 
to communicate with other bodies, or even governments of the MS. This inevitably undermines 
the independence of the ECB as a whole.
Thirdly, the SSM distorts the level-playing field within the internal market for financial 
services. The SSM Regulation states that it is ‘based on equal treatment of credit institutions with 
a view to preventing regulatory arbitrage’.202 Contrary to this, there is de facto different 
treatment of credit institutions supervised on national level and those supervised on EU level. 
This can be supported with the following example - the power of the ECB to remove members of 
the management board of a bank which are not ‘fit and proper’, given in Article 16(2)(m) SSM 
Regulation, is conditional upon transposition of the CRD.203 This is because the ‘fit and proper’ 
requirements are not defined by EU law. In this case, the ECB must apply the provisions of 
national law which transpose the CRD and which define what ‘fit and proper’ means. This 
basically means that the ECB acts in the same way as the national supervisory authorities. 
However, the ECB seems to have only received the powers to apply national law, without 
receiving the corollary obligations that fall on the national authorities. Here a reference is made
to obligations established in the case-law of the Court, particularly the Costanzo204 and the 
Wells205 case, which established: in the case of non-transposition or improper transposition of a 
directive and after the time-limit for transposition has passed, the national competent 
authorities are under the obligation to apply the provisions of that directive directly and refrain 
200 Recital 65, 66, 73, 55 and Article 25 SSM Regulation. See also, Interview with Danièle Nouy, Chair of the 
Supervisory Board of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, published on 7 June 2015 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/interviews/date/2015/html/sn150607.en.html (Accessed on 
19.04.2017). According to this interview, the separation goes so far that apparently, a bank can be insolvent for 
monetary policy concerns, and at the same time solvent for supervisory concerns.
201 S. Baroncelli, ‘The Independence of the ECB after the Economic Crisis’ in M. Adams, F. Fabbrini, and P. Larouche 
(eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Hart 2014), p. 141.
202 Article 1 SSM Regulation.
203 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of 
credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338–436 (Capital 
Requirements Directive – CRD)
204 Case 103/88 Costanzo [1989] EU:C:1989:256, paras. 31-33.
205 Case C-201/02 Wells [2004] EU:C:2004:12, para. 70.
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from applying provisions of national law which are contradictory to that directive. If this rule is 
applied to the example stated above, a national supervisor would have no problem to remove 
members of a management board of a bank under its supervision, even when there is no national 
law which defines the ‘fit and proper’ requirements. The ECB, however, cannot do so, because 
‘the binding nature of a directive, which constitutes the basis for the possibility of relying on it, 
exists only in relation to ‘each Member State to which it is addressed’’.206 Therefore, as stated 
above, the ECB cannot act when there is no national law transposing the CRD, whereas national 
supervisors can – a clear discrimination between banks supervised by national supervisors and 
those supervised by the ECB.
This can be resolved by expanding the Costanzo and Wells doctrines, so they would apply 
to all authorities, national and European, who have the power to apply provisions of national law. 
In this way, the ECB would as well have the obligation and possibility to set aside contradicting 
national provisions and apply the directive directly. Nevertheless, this is in contradiction to the 
previously cited paragraph from Marshall and moreover contrary to Article 288 TFEU. Not to 
mention the consequences that this would have on the cherished distinction between a 
regulation and a directive when it comes to direct effect.207 Another solution would be to define 
the powers of the ECB and the conditions under which they can be used in directly applicable EU 
law, such as a regulation.208 This would, of course, require complicated negotiations between the 
MS in the Parliament and Council, but nevertheless seems more reasonable than constitutional 
changes and overruling case-law. Until then, there will be different treatment of credit 
institutions, which goes contrary to the very purpose of the SSM Regulation.
To sum up, supervision on European level brings many benefits, both to the stability of 
the individual MS and the stability of the EU. The SSM was established when the time was ripe 
for deeper integration, even if this was mid-crisis period. However, there are problems when it 
comes to the functioning of the SSM which can undermine the rule of law or other established 
principles. It remains to be seen whether those problems will be fixed, either through legislative 
action or judicial review.
2.3.3 Broader, economic role of the ECB
As the crisis worsened, there was political will for certain mechanisms to be established 
which would preserve the financial stability. Since there was no legal basis in the Treaties for the 
206 Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] EU:C:1986:84, para. 48. Also, Case C‑ 425/12 Portgás [2013] EU:C:2013:829, para. 
22.
207 Opinion of AG Slynn in Case 152/84 Marshall [1985] EU:C:1985:345, p. 734.
208 In this regard, see Impact Assessment of the CRD, SEC(2011) 952 final, p. 146. The Commission had plans to 
introduce enhanced “fit and proper” test, which would be included in Binding Technical Standards developed by 
the EBA. However, the MS did not accept this reform. At the time of the writing of this thesis, there is not EU 
consensus on what ‘fit and proper’ means.
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creation of such mechanisms, the MS had to act through Intergovernmental Agreements. 
Nevertheless, the presence of the EU and its institutions in this field has increased as time passed.
Firstly, in 2010, a European Financial Stability Facility was created by the MS through the 
Council.209 This was a temporary solution which would offer financial relief to the MS which were 
worst hit by the crisis. Among those were Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The procedure was the 
following: a euro area MS had to submit a request for financial assistance to the EFSF. Then the 
so-called Troika - the Commission, in liaison with the International Monetary Fund and the ECB,
negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding with that MS, which had to be approved by the 
Eurogroup.210 Thus, the Eurogroup, consisted of all the finance ministers of the euro area MS,
and the Commission had the main role in the EFSF.
Such a temporary mechanism was indeed necessitated by the crisis and mitigated its 
negative consequences. However, it proved to be insufficient and there was a need for a
permanent firewall for the Eurozone which would be always functional and prepared to act at an 
early stage.
For this reason, the European Stability Mechanism was established in 2012 as a body of 
public international law.211 It is an international organization with legal personality and is 
currently separated from the EU. This is notwithstanding the fact that firstly, the Commission and 
the ECB are entrusted with carrying out the core tasks of the ESM,212 secondly, the purpose of 
the ESM is to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole213 and thirdly, 
membership in the ESM is conditional on being a euro area MS of the EU.214 The ESM took over 
the tasks of the EFSF and the EFSM, thus today all new financial assistance programmes are 
granted and covered by the ESM. Similarly as the previous mechanism, financial assistance 
granted through the ESM is subject to conditionality, inter alia, structural and macro-economic 
reforms, as agreed with the MS in a MoU. The main decision-making body of the ESM is the Board 
of Governors, consisted of representatives of the ESM MS.215 This body must approve the MoU, 
prior to its signing.
The establishment of this new permanent mechanism was authorized under EU law by 
Article 136(3) TFEU. This paragraph of Article 136 TFEU was added with the European Council 
Decision 2011/199,216 which amended the TFEU by using the simplified revision procedure.217 As 
209 Extraordinary Council meeting 9596/10 (Presse 108)
210 EFSF Framework Agreement 6.7.2010 (amended with effect from the Effective Date of the Amendments), p. 5
211 Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty) T/ESM 2012-LT 2012.
212 Ibid, Recital 10 and Article 13.
213 Ibid, Article 3.
214 Ibid, Article 2.
215 Ibid, Article 5. 
216 European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro, OJ L 91/1 
6.4.2011 p. 1.
217 Article 48(6) TEU, as introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.
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seen below, this Decision was challenged in the case of Pringle,218 a seminal case which has been 
adjudicated by a Full Court.219 This case demonstrated the Court’s view on the division between 
monetary and economic policy in the EU. Moreover, the Court decided whether the ESM Treaty 
increased the competences of the EU and whether ESM interferes with the monetary policy of 
the Union. Another point in Pringle - whether the ESM infringes Article 123 and 125 TFEU is 
examined in point 3.3 of this thesis. Thus, the text that follows focuses firstly, on the division of 
competences within the EMU and secondly, on the competences of the ECB within this rather 
unique EU constellation of separate monetary versus separate economic policy, as explained by 
the Court in the Pringle case. 
A) The division between monetary and economic policy in the EU
Currently there is a division of competences in the EMU – monetary union is exclusive 
competence of the EU, whereas economic policy is left to the MS. Even though the Treaties 
provide for clear delineation of competences between monetary and economic policy, they do 
not provide for clear definition of these policies. Because of this, it was just a question of time 
when a situation of uncertainty regarding the nature of the measure, and in turn, uncertainty 
regarding the competence to adopt the measure would arise. This was the subject matter of the 
Pringle case. Before discussing Pringle, it is important to note that some academics and 
economists blame exactly this division of competences for the crisis, stating that it is one of ‘the 
most unnecessary crisis [they] have ever seen’.220 In this regard, the lack of a ‘transfer union’ in 
addition to the monetary union, made fiscal transfers between the MS which would mitigate the 
differences in national income within the euro area impossible. Those differences in national 
income and economic development in the euro area caused financial imbalances,221 which were 
exacerbated by the global financial crisis.
Coming back to the reality in the EU, the Court in Pringle stated that there are three
relevant criteria for classifying a measure as economic or monetary: the objectives of the 
measure, the instruments provided in order to achieve those objectives and the link between 
that measure and other economic or monetary measures.222 Regarding the first criterion, the 
objective of the Union’s monetary policy, as implemented by the ESCB, is to maintain price 
stability i.e. low inflation.223 Contrary to this, the objective of the ESM is to preserve the financial 
stability of the euro area as a whole.224 Thus, the Court held that the ESM and the ESCB pursued 
218 Case C-370/12 Pringle [2012] EU:C:2012:756.
219 Article 16 Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. For other cases decided 
in Full Court, see Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] EU:C:2004:639 and Case C-222/02 Paul and Others [2004] 
EU:C:2004:606
220 David J. Powell, The Trader's Guide to the Euro Area: Economic Indicators, the ECB and the Euro Crisis 
(Bloomberg Press, 2013) p. 111. 
221 T. Mayer, Europe's Unfinished Currency: The Political Economics of the Euro (Anthem Press, 2012) p.75.
222 Case Pringle (n 218), para. 60.
223 Article 127(1) and 282(2) TFEU.
224 Case Pringle (n 218), para. 56.
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different objectives. However, in doing so, the Court seems to have adopted a narrow 
interpretation of the monetary policy of the Union and consequently, narrow interpretation on 
the mandate of the ECB, which is visible from para. 56 from Pringle:
“Even though the stability of the euro area may have repercussions on the stability of 
the currency used within that area, an economic policy measure cannot be treated as 
equivalent to a monetary policy measure for the sole reason that it may have indirect 
effects on the stability of the euro. [Reiterated in para. 97 Pringle] As is apparent from 
paragraph 56 of this judgment, any effect of the activities of the ESM on price stability 
is not such as to call into question that finding. Even if the activities of the ESM might 
influence the rate of inflation, such an influence would constitute only the indirect 
consequence of the economic policy measures adopted.”
Indeed, the role of a central bank is supposed to be defined narrowly225 and focused on 
price stability,226 especially when it comes to the ECB, whose status as independent expert body 
is stressed. This is also in accordance with the intentions of the creators of the ECB in Maastricht, 
as seen above in point 2.3.1 of this thesis. Such view of the Court makes it possible for the ESM 
to exist in parallel with the Union’s exclusive competence in monetary policy. On the other hand, 
this view may have repercussions on the functioning of the ECB. It may prevent the ECB from 
claiming that a certain measure interferes with price stability, thus falls within the ECB’s mandate. 
For example, the ECB’s power to stop the provision of national Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 
which is not part of monetary policy227 but only indirectly affects price stability, may fall within 
economic policy and outside of the mandate of the ECB. Nevertheless, the ECB may be enjoying
broad discretion under Article 14.4 ESCB Statute228 when it comes to stalling NCB measures, even 
though the Court still has not interpreted that Article. In any way, the Court’s narrow definition 
of monetary policy as a policy concerned with price stability and the definition of economic policy 
as a broader policy concerned with the overall financial stability seems reasonable and well-
founded.
Regarding the second criterion, the instruments of monetary policy are setting the key 
interest rates for the euro area and issuing euro currency.229 On the other hand, the grant of 
financial assistance to a MS, as envisaged by Articles 14 to 18 ESM Treaty, clearly do not fall within 
monetary policy, according to the Court.230 Again, the Court adopts a restrictive interpretation 
225 A. Hinarejos, Institutional Responses to the Crisis p.4 in A. Hinarejos, The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional
Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2015).
226 K. Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2015) p. 174.
227 Article 2(29) of European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms [2014] OJ L173/190. See also, W. Buiter, J. 
Michels, E. Rahbari, ‘ELA: An Emperor without Clothes?’ (2011) Global Economics View, p. 4.
228 B. Scouteris, P. Athanassiou, National Central Bank Tasks and the Boundaries of the ECB Governing Council’s 
Powers under Article 14.4 Of the Statute: State of Play and Future Prospects (2015) SSRN Research Paper, p. 2.
229 Case Pringle (n 218), para. 96.
230 Ibid, para. 57.
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on which instruments fall within monetary policy, making the ECB’s broad perception of Article 
14.4 ESCB Statute questionable. The ECB has several times interfered with national measures 
which fall outside of monetary policy, such as ELA or NCB’s own investment operations and even 
though such decisions are undisclosed, they are most likely based on Article 14.4 ESCB Statute. If 
a person affected by such decision brings an action before the Court and the Court decides to 
follow its Pringle reasoning, it is very likely that such a decision would be annulled as ultra vires.
This is because, according to Pringle, the burden of proof falls on the ECB, which would have to 
show that the NCB’s measure has more than mere ‘indirect effects on the stability of the euro’.231
The last criterion for classification of a measure as economic or monetary is the link
between on the one hand, the measure in question and on the other, the Treaty provisions and 
the provisions of the EU regulatory framework. This criterion need to be assessed individually in 
each case. In the case of ESM, the Court held that that mechanism is closely linked to Articles 120 
to 126 TFEU and to the so-called regulatory ‘six pack’ for strengthened economic governance of 
the Union. The close link between these provisions of EU law and the ESM is that the EU 
provisions are preventive, as they reduce as far as possible the risk of public debt crises, whereas 
the ESM is proactive, as it regulates the management of financial crises which, notwithstanding 
the preventive efforts, might nonetheless occur.232
The Pringle case is the first case to offer some criteria which shed light on the division 
between monetary and economic policy, and thus reduce the clash of competences between the 
MS and the EU. In the end, it may be said that the Pringle criteria are, in a way, stringent, since 
they reduce the scope of monetary policy. Because of this, they are unlikely to be applied in the 
same strict way again, at least not until the crisis completely ends. In this regard, it seems that 
the first qualification of the Pringle criteria happened in the Gauweiler case,233 presented below.
B) The competences of the EU and the ECB before vs. after the creation of the ESM
One of the questions referred by the Irish Court concerned whether Decision 2011/199, 
which provided for the compliance of ESM with EU law, increased the competences of the Union. 
If the decision did so, it would contravene Article 48(6) TEU and would be invalid. However, the
more substantial question is whether the tasks conferred on the EU institutions by this 
mechanism influence their tasks conferred by the Treaties. The Court firstly held that the Decision 
itself did not create new legal basis for the Union to be able to undertake any action which was 
not possible before the entry into force of the Decision,234 thus it was within the limits of Article 
48(6) TEU.
231 This was the subject matter of the Alcimos case, see infra note 364. The applicant claimed that the amount of 
ELA is insignificant and cannot affect price stability. However, the General Court did not go to the substance, as the 
case was dismissed as inadmissible.
232 Ibid, para. 58-59.
233 Case Gauweiler (n 131).
234 Ibid, paras. 71-76.
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Regarding the more substantial question of the role of EU institutions within the ESM, the 
Court reiterated that the MS are entitled to entrust tasks to the institutions, outside the 
framework of the Union,235 provided that those tasks do not alter the essential character of the 
powers conferred on those institutions by the EU and the Treaties.236 The Court established that 
the role of the ECB within the ESM is in line with the TFEU,237 particularly Article 282(2) TFEU, 
which states that the ESCB ‘shall support the general economic policies in the Union in order to 
contribute to the achievement’ of monetary policy objectives. The conclusion to be taken from 
Pringle is that the involvement of EU institutions within the ESM is not in any way an impediment 
for their EU tasks. It is instead beneficial, as their participation ensures that the actions of the 
ESM are consistent with EU law.
However, such conclusion is questionable. The EU institutions fulfil the main tasks of the 
ESM and are the main actors in the procedure for granting stability support, as regulated in Article 
13 ESM Treaty. More particularly, the role of the ECB within the ESM is to: assess the urgency of 
requests for stability support,238 participate in the meetings of the Board of Governors and the 
Board of Directors as an observer,239 assess requests for stability support,240 negotiate a MoU,241
and monitor compliance with the conditionality attached to the financial assistance.242 It should 
be noted that the ECB does not fulfil these tasks alone, but as part of the Troika. The roles of the 
ECB within the ESM are examined separately, as follows.
Firstly, the ECB has the discretionary power to decide that a decision to grant or 
implement financial assistance must be granted urgently, if the economic and financial 
sustainability of the euro area is threatened. The word ‘discretionary power’ is used, as the 
procedure for assessing the threat posed to the stability of the euro area by a defaulting MS is 
defined nowhere. Considering that the main decision-making body of the ECB is the Governing 
Council, it is most likely this body that can adopt such a decision.  However, as stated in point 
2.2.1, the votes in the Governing Council rotate, and currently the 19 euro area Governors share 
15 votes, whereas the 6 executive members of the Governing Council have 1 vote each. Since the 
Governing Council adopts decisions with simple majority, the executive members would need 
only 5 more votes from the Governors, to initiate the emergency voting procedure for granting 
financial support by the ESM to a MS. Under this ESM emergency voting procedure, a qualified 
majority of 85% of the votes cast in the ESM Board of Governors is required in order to provide 
financial support by the ESM or to give mandate to the Commission and the ECB to negotiate the 
economic policy conditionality attached to each financial assistance. Contrary to this, under the 
235 Ibid, para. 158. See also, Joined Cases C‑ 181/91 and C‑ 248/91 Parliament v Council and Commission [1993] 
EU:C:1993:271, para. 22.
236 Opinion 1/09 of the Court [2011] EU:C:2011:123, para. 75.
237 Case Pringle (n 218), para. 165.
238 Article 4(4) ESM Treaty.
239 Ibid, Articles 5(3) and Article 6(2).
240 Ibid, Article 13(1).
241 Ibid, Article 13(3).
242 Ibid, Article 13(7).
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ESM regular voting procedure, the previous two decisions require unanimity in the ESM Board of 
Governors.
Secondly, the president of the ECB may participate in the meetings of the ESM Board of 
Governors as observer. It is clear that observers do not have a right to vote, as voting rights are 
calculated based on the shares of the MS in the ESM.243 However neither the ESM Treaty nor the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board of Governors244 prohibit the president of the ECB from speaking 
in the debate on the matters under consideration, before the official voting takes place. This 
enables the ECB to influence the Governors in the Board of Governors. The ECB has the relevant 
data regarding the monetary situation in the euro area and moreover, has banking sector 
information, as it is a prudential supervisor. Because of this, the opinion of the president of the 
ECB is seen as reliable and valuable and seems unlikely to be opposed by a Governor of a MS.
Thus, the ECB, even though formally not part of the voting process, has its say in the ESM.
Thirdly, the ECB assesses the request for financial support. This is a three-part
assessment: the existence of a risk to the financial stability of the euro area, the sustainability of 
the public debt of the MS and the actual or potential financing needs of the MS. Undoubtedly, 
this is one of the few, if not the only task where participation of the ECB in the ESM is justified. 
This is because the ECB is best placed to decide on these technical financial matters. As seen in 
point 2.3.2 of this thesis, the ECB has the relevant macro-economic data, such as the public debt 
or the budget deficit, from the ESRB. Also, the ECB, as prudential supervisor for significant banks, 
has information regarding the liquidity needs of the banks and the real value of their assets. The 
IMF also has a role to play in the assessment of the public debt, because it has the expertise and 
data on global imbalances, such as balance of payments.245 The ECB, as a central bank close to 
the national and the EU internal financial market, and of the IMF, as actor in the global financial 
market, complement each other so that a well-supported and thorough examination of the MS 
in question can be carried out.
Fourthly, the ECB is part of the negotiation process for a MoU. This is the most 
problematic role of the ECB within the ESM. Exactly as the de Larosière Report warned, the ECB’s 
involvement in the process of providing financial support can be detrimental to its Treaty-
protected independence. Participating in the negotiation process means that ECB and the 
Commission, on the one hand, and the MS concerned, on the other, will define firstly, the 
financial assistance instrument to be provided and secondly, the conditionality attached to that 
assistance. The former can be in the form of cash or cashless disbursement, and the latter in the
form of reforms in the banking sector, public finances and markets. The process of negotiating a 
MoU is highly sensitive both for the one granting the loan and for the one receiving it.
243 Ibid, Article 4(7).
244 Article 5 European Stability Mechanism Rules of Procedure of the Board of Governors, 8 October 2012.
245 X. Miranda, Role of the IMF in the Global Financial Crisis (2011) Cato Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2010, p. 483. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2254002
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This is because the ESM’s capital stock is divided into paid-in shares and callable shares.246
The paid-in capital comes from the MS participating in the ESM i.e. from their budgets. Even 
though the ESM Board of Governors makes the final decision, it is the ECB and the Commission 
that negotiate the amount and the type of financial support to be provided to the troubled MS. 
On the other hand, the ECB and the Commission negotiate the structural reforms to be carried 
out by the MS in its economy, as reciprocity for the loan granted. Such reforms can have different 
form, but the practical result is almost always the same - decreasing public expenditure and 
increasing public revenue. In the short term, this has the effect of lowering the income of the 
citizens of the MS concerned. Because of this, protests and civil unrest often follow the signing 
of a MoU.247 Thus, the ECB and the Commission have at their disposal tax-payers’ money and 
decide under which conditions that money can be given to a MS. Admittedly, the ECB has 
information regarding the flaws in the economy of the MS and can offer solutions for such 
problems, however direct involvement in the negotiations is not necessary.
Instead, such direct involvement of the ECB has several consequences. Most importantly, 
the independence of the ECB may be jeopardized and its mandate breached. Article 130 TFEU
does not apply to the tasks of the ECB within the ESM and clearly, the ECB when fulfilling its tasks 
within the ESM has to take into consideration the requests of the MS of the ESM and be aware 
of the political circumstances. On the other hand, that Article applies when the ECB is carrying 
out the tasks conferred upon it by the Treaties and the ESCB Statute, and requires that the ECB 
is not influenced by any external body when conducting the monetary policy of the Union. 
However, it is hard to maintain that the tasks of the ECB within the ESM do not have any 
repercussions on the conduct of monetary policy. It can be reasonably claimed that the ECB 
pressured MS, such as Portugal and Spain, into seeking financial assistance from the ESM, by 
using monetary policy instruments.248 This, of course, undermines the valued principle of central 
bank independence and significantly exceeds the narrow mandate of preserving price stability.
The high concentration of powers in the hands of the ECB makes it a powerful negotiator within 
the ESM, but apparently, the price for that power is the undermining of the independence of the 
ECB in monetary policy. Moreover, the reputation of the ECB and the trust in it as an independent 
EU institution suffer from such interference with the national fiscal or economic policy. The more 
an expert body, such as the ECB adopts features of a stakeholder or a politician, the more it will 
lose credibility.249
The final task of the ECB within the ESM is to monitor compliance with the MoU. Again, 
the ECB is in a dominant position as it has at its disposal a wide range of powers. Using the 
monetary prerogatives granted by the Treaties for the purposes of the ESM must not be allowed, 
246 Article 8 ESM Treaty.
247 In this regard see, anti-austerity movements in Greece and Spain.
248 T. Beukers, The new ECB and its Relationship with the Eurozone Member States: Between Central Bank 
independence and Central Bank intervention (2013) in CMLR 50, p. 1595.
249 K. Tuori and K. Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 221.
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but it is tolerated in practice.250 Similarly as stated in the previous paragraph, there were cases 
where the ECB decided to repeal the suspension of the Eurosystem’s minimum requirements for 
credit quality thresholds251 or to decide to stall the national ELA252 unless the MS complies with 
structural reforms in the economy as requested by the signed MoU. Such use of monetary powers 
in order to coerce a MS into complying with its obligations in the ESM is somewhat justified by 
the legitimate aim of ‘breaking the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns’.253 National 
banks buying government bonds in order to prevent sovereign default of the MS, then the 
government, through the NCB, giving ELA to the same national banks in order to keep them liquid 
is one of the most aggravating short-term measures to be taken and of course, needs to be 
stopped. Nevertheless, the ECB and the Court have so far not provided any limit to the means for 
achieving such aim, even though the rule of law requires for every action to have its limits.
To sum up, the creation of the ESM and the involvement of the ECB in it, undoubtedly 
increased the power of the ECB. It is true that a monetary expert body such as the ECB, must 
have a role to play within an organization the purpose of which is to safeguard the financial 
stability of the euro area. However, such role of the ECB should be limited to what is truly 
necessary. Nevertheless, it seems that the new economic role of the ECB fits it well and the 
results are obvious as the crisis is coming to an end, but the repercussions of such new roles to 
the monetary policy are yet to be seen.
2.3.4 Monetary role of the ECB after Gauweiler
Apart from assuming supervisory and economic role, the monetary role of the ECB has 
also evolved with time. It evolved in sense that the ECB today can act in the field of monetary 
policy in a way in which was impossible before the crisis. The scope of the monetary policy has 
significantly broadened during the crisis. Here a reference is made to the Gauweiler case,254
where the Court held, in a very controversial and criticized judgment, that the ECB Outright 
Monetary Transactions programme falls within monetary policy and thus, within the mandate of 
the ECB. The OMT programme includes purchasing bonds in secondary sovereign bond markets 
without any restrictions regarding the quantity or the quality of those bonds. The only condition 
is that the MS must respect the macroeconomic adjustment programme as agreed within the 
EFSF or ESM. The aim of such a programme is to safeguard the monetary policy transmission and 
250 A. Hinarejos, Institutional Responses to the Crisis p. 6 in A. Hinarejos, The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional
Perspective (Oxford, 2015).
251 Decision (EU) 2016/457 of the European Central Bank of 16 March 2016 on the eligibility of marketable debt 
instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Republic of Cyprus (ECB/2016/5) OJ L 79/41 30.3.2016.
252 Governing Council decision on Emergency Liquidity Assistance requested by the Central Bank of Cyprus (Press 
release, accessed on 07.05.2017). https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr130321.en.html
(Accessed on 20.04.2016).
253 Draghi says EU bank union to break 'vicious' circle - https://euobserver.com/economic/118553 (Accessed on 
20.04.2017). Also see, P. de Grauwe, Design Failures in the Eurozone - can they be fixed?, European Commission 
Economic Papers 491 (2013), p. 9.
254 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler [2015] EU:C:2015:400.
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the singleness of the monetary policy.255 This is clearly a broader aim than the one assigned to 
the ECB by the Treaties - maintaining price stability. Because of this, the German Constitutional 
Court for the first time decided to refer a question to the Court regarding the validity of the OMT 
programme. Even though the BVerfG is a court ‘against whose decisions there is no judicial 
remedy under national law’,256 this case cannot be seen as a long overdue normalisation of the 
relations between the Court and the BVerfG.257 On the contrary, this case further deepens the 
troublesome relationship, as it is worded less like a question and more like a statement from the 
BVerfG. The wording is strict and the claims are well-supported, which makes the Court’s task 
particularly hard, if it is to disagree with the BVerfG. On the other hand, the OMT programme 
was announced in a press release, which had repercussions on the admissibility of the case.258
Aside from these specific aspects, the Gauweiler case dealt with important substantial issues for 
the EMU. The main concerns were whether the OMT programme falls outside of the mandate of 
the ECB and whether the OMT programme is compatible with Article 123 TFEU.
Firstly, the Court held that the OMT programme falls within the mandate of the ECB, as it 
is part of the monetary policy of the Union. It defined monetary policy in accordance with the 
Pringle judgment,259 by referring to the objectives and instruments of that policy. As mentioned 
previously, the OMT programme has the objective of safeguarding two elements: the singleness 
and the transmission of monetary policy. Both of them, even though linked to price stability, are 
necessarily broader that it. Nevertheless, the Court established that in accordance with Article 
119(2) TFEU monetary policy must be ‘single’, hence the first objective of the OMT programme 
fell within monetary policy.260 Even though, such reasoning seems to be tautological and 
insufficient, the substantial broadening of the ECB’s mandate is seen in paragraph 50 Gauweiler: 
“The ability of the ESCB to influence price developments by means of its monetary 
policy decisions in fact depends, to a great extent, on the transmission of the 
‘impulses’ which the ESCB sends out across the money market to the various sectors 
of the economy. Consequently, if the monetary policy transmission mechanism is 
disrupted, that is likely to render the ESCB’s decisions ineffective in a part of the euro 
area and, accordingly, to undermine the singleness of monetary policy. Moreover, 
since disruption of the transmission mechanism undermines the effectiveness of the 
measures adopted by the ESCB, that necessarily affects the ESCB’s ability to guarantee 
price stability. Accordingly, measures that are intended to preserve that transmission 
255 ECB press release, Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html (Accessed on 20.5.2017) 
256 Article 267(3) TFEU.
257 For the relations between these two courts, see BVefrG [1974] 2 CMLR 540 (Solange I); BVerfG [1987] 3 CMLR 
225 (Solange II); BVerfG [1994] 1 CMLR 57 (Maastrich rulling); 2 BvE 2/08, 30 June 2009 (Lisbon rulling); BVerfG, 2 
BvR 2661/06, 6 July 2010 (Honeywell).
258 Case Gauweiler (n 254), para. 23.
259 See point 2.3.3 of this thesis.
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mechanism may be regarded as pertaining to the primary objective laid down in 
Article 127(1) TFEU.”
According to this paragraph, the ECB is able to intervene in any part of the transmission 
mechanism, including the lack of confidence in the markets or the stagnating market for financial 
services. Such an interpretation of Article 127(1) is clearly at odds with the ordoliberal views 
according to which the ECB was created and the narrow mandate accorded to it by the Maastricht 
Treaty. The Court continued by stating that any effect of the OMT programme on the stability of 
the euro area is ‘indirect’,261 even though it may ‘increase the impetus to comply with the ESM 
adjustment programmes’.262 Thus, in the light of its objectives, in the Court’s view the OMT 
programme falls within monetary policy and within the mandate of the ECB. Moreover, in the 
light of its instruments, the OMT programme also falls within monetary policy. This is
notwithstanding the fact that when the ESM uses the same instrument i.e. buying government 
bonds on the secondary market subject to compliance with the MoU, it acts within the economic 
policy. Admittedly, Article 18.1 ESCB Statute enables the ECB and the NCB to ‘operate in the 
financial markets by buying and selling outright marketable instruments in euro’ and the Court 
has stressed this in paragraph 54 of Gauweiler. The Court distinguished between the ECB and the 
ESM, again, in light of the different objectives they pursue,263 thereby giving excessive weight 
and importance to the objective pursued. As mentioned on page 31 of this thesis, it is hard to 
determine the objective of a certain measure in court proceedings, thus most of the time the 
applicant will not succeed in proving the pursue of different objective than the one stated in the 
measure. 
Secondly, regarding the prohibition of monetary financing contained in Article 123 TFEU,
the Court established that there are sufficient safeguards built into the OMT programme that 
ensure it is in accordance with Article 123 TFEU. The purpose of this Article, seen from its travaux 
préparatoires is to encourage the MS to follow a sound budgetary policy,264 not allowing a 
common EMU to lead to ‘moral hazard’ i.e. not to allow the MS to have unsound and reckless 
budgetary policy, with hope that the Union will bear the cost of such policy. The Court held that 
the OMT programme does not go against such purpose of Article 123 TFEU. The ECB is free to 
decide if and when to buy government bonds on the secondary markets. It is also free to decide 
how much it will buy and when to resell those bonds. All this prevents the MS and its creditors 
to know with certainty that the ECB will buy their bonds.265 Also, the OMT programme applies to 
the MS which are undergoing a structural adjustment programme. This means that its scope is 
restricted which minimizes the impact on the financial situation in the euro area.266 The fact that 
261 Ibid, para. 52.
262 Ibid, para. 58.
263 Ibid, para. 64.
264 Draft Treaty amending the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community with a view to achieving 
economic and monetary union, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/91, p. 24 and 54
265 Case Gauweiler (n 254), para. 107.
266 Ibid, para. 116.
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ECB ensures a minimum period between the issue and the purchase on the secondary market 
also helps in this regard.267
Thus, the Court, despite the pressure from the BVefrG, decided that the OMT programme 
is compliant with Union law. It is true that the reasoning in Gauweiler may be flawed, however 
thus must not undermine the fact that the OMT programme literally ended the downward spiral
in the EU economy. The famous ‘whatever it takes’ speech by Mario Draghi and the 
announcement of the OMT programme increased confidence in the markets and practically gave 
them what they wanted to hear.268 It basically bought time for the troubled MS to reform the 
economies and become competitive again. With the OMT programme the ECB handled the 
financial crisis similarly to the Federal Reserve in the USA. In this regard, the Federal Reserve 
immediately in 2008 announced its Troubled Asset Relief Programme amounting to 700 billion 
dollars.269 This calmed the market and made the crisis less severe. In the EU, however, the OMT 
programme was announced in 2012, when the crisis was starting to threaten the survival of the 
euro.
After Pringle - where the ECB’s participation in the ESM was approved, after Gauweiler -
where the ECB’s mandate was extended, and after the SSM Regulation - where the ECB received 
supervisory powers and tasks, it started to look more like the Banque de France, than the 
Bundesbank. The initial influence from the ordoliberal ideas, which required that the only task of 
a central bank is to preserve price stability and act fully independently, seems to have weakened.
Today, the ECB is driven by the need for sound economic policy and prudent banking sector, in 
addition to ensuring a stable monetary policy. Even the scope of monetary policy is broader than 
before. Even though this is not necessarily bad, the fact that such shift occurred as a result of a 
financial crisis and without much institutional debate can be problematic.
267 Ibid, para. 106.
268 H. Kalimo and M. Jansson, EU economic law in time of crisis (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) p. 23.
269 A. D. Lefebvre, Government Bailout: Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (Nova Science Publishers, 2010) p. 
38. See also, N. Jabko, The Elusive Economic Government and the Forgotten Fiscal Union p. 9, in M. Matthijs and 
M. Blyth, The Future of the Euro (Oxford, 2015).
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3. Other EU bodies and institutions
The ECB, even though the most important actor in the crisis, is not the only actor. Almost 
every EU institution has acted, within the sphere of its competences, in order to mitigate the 
consequences of the crisis, but also in order to prevent another crisis like this from occurring.
Their actions can be classified, according to the instruments they use and the aims they pursue, 
in three broad groups of actions: crisis management measures, measures for regulatory reform 
and measures from institutional reform. 
Firstly, crisis management measures are measures with immediate effect and serve short-
term interests, such as allowing the economy and the markets to continue to function during 
crisis times by introducing favourable measures. These measures are exceptional and need to be 
modified or revoked according to the circumstances in the economy. Because of this, they require 
close monitoring of the markets and acting swiftly and accordingly. In this regard, there are 
doubts whether the EU, as a supranational entity, is in a good position to adopt crisis 
management measures. Such measures require clear competence, wide executive discretion and 
high expertise. The EU lacks at least the first two elements, thus it better equipped to contribute 
to law reform than crisis management.270 However, the Commission has proved that this is not 
entirely true. It constantly followed the situation in the markets and adopted measures, most 
notably in the field of state aid for banks and winding up of credit institutions.271
Secondly, measures for regulatory reform are measures intended to help with the current 
crisis, but at the same time make the Union more resistant to future crises of this kind. Again, the 
Commission was the institution most involved in such a process. Of course, unlike crisis measures, 
the Commission when adopting measures for substantive law reform is dependent on Council 
and Parliament consent. The EU is well equipped for such a task as it can assess the systemic 
flaws in the economy and can enact measures that erase those flaws. Some of the measures 
falling in this category are the previously mentioned SSM Regulation or CRD.
Lastly, measures that reform the institutional architecture of the EU are closely linked to 
the measures that reform the substantive law. This is because any institutional change, to some 
extent, changes the substantive law or adapts it to the new architecture. The Commission 
proposed measures like this as well. However, as it does not have the required expertise in this 
field, it appointed expert groups, such as the Lamfalussy Committee or the previously 
commented de Larosière group.272 After these expert groups gave their opinion, the Commission 
(mostly) followed that opinion and acted accordingly. Nevertheless, this type of measures are
270 T. Tridimas, Federalization, crisis management, and law reform, in P. Craig, The Evolution of EU Law (2011) 
p.796.
271 See most recently, Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid 
rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (Banking Communication) OJ C 
216/1 30.7.2013.
272 See point 2.3.2 of this thesis.
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contentious and criticised, because they create new bodies and often centralise a certain field of 
law on EU level. Moreover, this occurs without Treaty changes – such changes are brought about 
through secondary EU law, such as EU regulations. Because of this, the validity of these measures 
is frequently challenged before the CJEU.
Apart from the Commission, whose work will be assessed in the next point, other 
institutions will be examined as well. Among those are the ESM, the various European agencies, 
and the CJEU. A separate point in this chapter is reserved for each of these institutions and 
bodies.
3.1 European Commission
The Commission, as Guardian of the Treaties,273 has a special role to play in every field of 
EU law. Especially in times of crisis the role of the Commission to adopt crisis measures and to 
adapt the EU legal order to the crisis, is crucial. Indeed, the Commission in light of the financial 
crisis, has lived up to its expectations. The work of the Commission concerning the legal and 
institutional reform has been incorporated in different points of this thesis,274 therefore this part 
focuses on the crisis management measures.
Even at the outset of the financial crisis in 2008, the Commission has adopted the first 
2008 Banking Communication275 which had the aim to safeguard the stability of the financial 
system by setting a framework, within which the MS can adopt necessary measures to help the 
financial institutions.276 This measure has been specifically taken from the crisis, and presents the 
view of the Commission regarding the application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU277 in times of financial 
crisis, when there is increased need for recourse to state aid exceptions. When assessing state 
aid exceptions in normal circumstances, another Guidelines from 2004278 apply. Thus, the crisis 
Communication from 2008 increased the scope of Article 107(3)(b) and adopted a less restrictive 
interpretation of that state aid exception. This is notwithstanding the statement of the 
Commission that the interpretation of Article 107(3)(b) remains restrictive.279 Afterwards, the 
Commission adopted the Recapitalisation Communication,280 the Impaired Assets 
273 Article 17(1) TEU.
274 See points 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, but also 3.2 and 3.3 of this thesis.
275 Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to measures taken in
relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis OJ C 270/8 25.10.2008.
276 Ibid, recital 4.
277 At the time of the adoption of the Communication, it was Article 87(3)(c) TEC.
278 Communication from the Commission - Community Guidelines on State Aid for rescuing and restructuring firms 
in difficulty OJ C 244/2 1.10.2004.
279 Communication from 2008, see supra note 275, point 8.
280 Communication on the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to 
the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p.2.
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Communication281 and the Restructuring Communication.282 They dealt with specific types of 
state aid which fell under the exception, and applied in addition to the Banking Communication.
After the adoption of these Communications, the Commission kept monitoring the 
market and the financial circumstances. This is because the Communications were temporary in 
nature and would not apply once the crisis has ended. This was stressed in the 2010 Prolongation 
Communication,283 point 17 of which stated that starting from 2012 a gradual transition to a 
more permanent regime of State aid guidelines would take place. This proved to be optimistic as 
there was, after this period, still a need to help the banks financially. Because of this, two more 
Banking Communications were adopted, the 2011 Prolongation Communication284 and the latest 
Banking Communication.285 Analysis of the substance of all of these Communications is outside 
of the scope of this thesis, therefore in the next paragraphs, only the latest Banking 
Communication from 2013 is going to be analysed.
The Banking Communication from 2013, as the previous Communications from the 
Commission, is giving the view of the Commission regarding the application of Article 107(3)(b) 
TFEU which allows for aid in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a MS. The 
legal nature of the Banking Communication was given by the Court in the Kotnik case,286 where 
the validity of the Communication was challenged. The Court held that the Banking 
Communication is not binding on the MS or on EU institutions, except on the Commission. The 
Commission, by the adoption of the Banking Communication, which lists the conditions for the 
application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, limited its discretion when it comes to that Article. This is 
because, such a document created legitimate expectations for the persons concerned, which 
require, together with the principle of equal treatment, that the Commission follows the 
conditions stated therein.287 Thus, when state aid fulfils the conditions in the Communication, 
the Commission must authorize that aid. On the other hand, when state aid does not fulfil those 
conditions, the Commission cannot a priori prohibit that aid, but must examine the specific 
exceptional circumstances in that particular case.288 According to this, through the Banking 
281 Communication from the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community financial sector OJ 
C 72, 26.3.2009, p. 1.
282 Communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in 
the current crisis under the State aid rules OJ C 195, 19.8.2009, p.9.
283 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2011, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of financial institutions in the context of the financial crisis OJ C 329, 7.12.2010, p.7.
284 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of financial institutions in the context of the financial crisis OJ C 356, 6.12.2011, p.7.
285 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’) OJ C 216/1 30.7.2013 
p.1.
286 Case C‑ 526/14 Kotnik [2016] EU:C:2016:570.
287 Ibid, para. 40.
288 Ibid, para. 43.
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Communication, the Commission informs the MS of its interpretation of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU 
in times of crisis, so that the MS know beforehand what to expect.
Regarding the substance of the Banking Communication, the most important feature is 
the requirement of burden-sharing, as a prerequisite for authorizing state aid under Article 
107(3)(b) TFEU. This requirement is in place to counter the problem of moral-hazard. 289 The very 
fact that state aid is given more often than usual and moreover, that the Commission recognizes 
the need for the MS to finance the economy in crisis times, can encourage individuals to engage 
in risk-taking, believing that the possible negative consequences of such actions will be borne by 
the community. The Banking Communication makes clear that the loses of a financial institution 
are first to be absorbed by equity, then by hybrid capital holders and lastly by subordinated debt 
holders.290 Only after such internal contributions, known as bail-in, have taken place, there can 
be external contributions from the budget of the State, known as bail-out. This is also in 
accordance with the requirement to keep state aid and distortions of competition between banks 
and across Member States to the minimum.291 This burden-sharing requirement was challenged 
by several individuals, whose deposits were seized i.e. bailed-in, in order for that bank to be 
eligible for state aid, in accordance with the Communication. This is assessed in part 3.3 of this 
thesis.
Another important point of the Banking Communication is the one relating to the 
provision of dedicated support by the NCB to commercial banks, known as Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance. Even though usually the activities of NCB do not fall within the scope of state aid 
rules, the provision of central bank money to a credit institution292 may constitute state aid and 
therefore, needs to be assessed by the Commission. The conditions stated in point 62 of the 
Banking Communication are the following: firstly, the credit institution must be temporarily 
illiquid, but solvent at the time of the liquidity provision, secondly, the facility must be fully 
secured by appropriate collateral, thirdly, the central bank must charge a penal interest rate to 
the beneficiary and lastly, the measure must be taken at the central bank's own initiative. If these 
conditions are fulfilled, the Commission can accept that ELA is notified after its approval on 
national level.293 In this case, ELA will be assessed subsequently as part of the restructuring 
plan.294 As mentioned in point 2.3.3 of this thesis, ELA also falls within the competence of the 
ECB under Article 14.4 ESCB Statute. Because of this, there may be clash of competences between 
the Commission and the ECB, when it comes to the approval of ELA. In order to avoid such a 
clash, it is important that each of these institutions assesses ELA from different aspects. The 
289 Point 15 and 40 Banking Communication.
290 Ibid, point 41.
291 Ibid, point 7.
292 ELA definition, found in ‘the procedures underlying the Governing Council’s role pursuant to Article 14.4 of the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank with regard to the provision of 
ELA to individual credit institutions’ p. 1.
293 Point 56 Banking Communication.
294 Ibid, note 20.
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Commission needs to assess ELA from a competition aspect i.e. whether the grant of ELA is 
compatible with the internal market, whereas the ECB needs to assess ELA from a monetary 
aspect i.e. whether the grant of ELA affects price stability. This can be achieved if both the ECB 
and the Commission state clearly, in their decisions assessing ELA, the reasons for adopting the 
decision. Otherwise, they risk having their decisions annulled as ultra vires.
Lastly, state guaranties are treated in the Banking Communication similarly as liquidity 
assistance and can be notified to the Commission after their implementation. The most 
important condition is that only senior debt can be guaranteed and must be given to banks which 
have no capital shortfall.295 This is again, to prevent moral hazard.
The crisis communications and guidelines adopted by the Commission certainly provided 
for relief in times of crisis. They made the procedure for approving state aid faster and simpler, 
which made it possible for the distressed economy to continue to function. However, these is not 
the only measures taken by the Commission.
In addition to this, in 2010, the Commission initiated a separate emergency funding 
programme - the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism.296 Through this mechanism the 
Commission provided financial support to MS experiencing severe financial difficulties by using 
bonds issued on behalf of the EU.297 Greece, Ireland and Portugal were given financial support 
through the EFSM, conditional on the implementation of reforms. The EFSM today remains in 
place for specific tasks such as the lengthening of maturities for loans to Ireland, Portugal or 
Greece and monitor the previously approved loans to them. The Commission also plays an 
important role in the process of granting loans from the EFSF and the ESM.
3.2 Agencies of the European Union
As part of the integration process of the market for financial services, many European 
agencies were created. Also, as seen in point 2.3.2 of this thesis, already existing EU institutions 
acquired new tasks in the financial market. The Commission’s role in the establishment of these 
agencies is crucial. It proposes the regulatory framework for the agencies to the Parliament and 
Council, having previously obtained the opinion of committees and expert groups on the matter.
In this regard, the Committee of wise men on the regulation of European securities 
markets, chaired by Mr. Alexandre Lamfalussy and composed of distinguished economists, was 
one of those committees. It was given the task of proposing how financial market integration in 
the EU should be carried out. The report of this Committee, which was subsequently endorsed 
295 Ibid, points 58 and 59.
296 Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism, 
OJ L 118, 12.5.2010, p. 1–4.
297 Ibid, Article 2.
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by the EU, recommended four level regulatory approach to be established.298 Level 1 
encompasses the framework principles formulated through regulations or directives adopted 
through the ordinary legislative procedure by the Parliament and the Council. Level 2 measures 
are implementing the details, but always remain within the Level 1 framework. These 
implementing measures are to be drafted by a European Securities Committee299 and adopted 
by the Commission. Level 3 measures are guidelines and common standards adopted by different 
committees of national supervisors. There were three such committees: Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS),300 Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors (CEIOPS)301 and Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR).302 In their 
respective fields of competence, this committees also advised the Commission in the adoption 
of level 2 acts.  At level 4, the duty of the Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, is stressed. In 
this regard, the Commission is to enforce the rules and monitor the regulatory system. In short, 
the EU legislature was concerned only with the essential issues and the Commission 
implemented them in practice by adopting the measures of expert committees. This benefit of 
such regulatory approach is speeding up the integration process, but at the same time keeping it 
democratic and transparent.303
However, the crisis necessitated deeper integration in the financial market than the one 
provided by the Level 3 committees. Because of this, and in accordance with the de Larosière 
Report, the Level 3 committees were replaced by new European Supervisory Authorities with 
increased powers of supervision. They are going to be assessed separately below.
Also, a complete Banking Union is composed of firstly, single supervisory mechanism, 
secondly, single resolution mechanism and thirdly, a single deposit guarantee scheme. Single 
banking supervision was achieved with the SSM Regulation and empowering the ECB, whereas 
single banking resolution with the SRM Regulation and the creation of the SRB.304 The single 
deposit guarantee scheme remains still at national level, with a Directive305 harmonising this 
field. Therefore, the SRM Regulation and the SRB are going to be examined below as well.
298 Lamfalussy report, p.20.
299 Commission Decision of 6 June 2001 establishing the European Securities Committee 2001/528/EC, OJ L 191, 
13/07/2001, p. 0045 – 0046.
300 Commission Decision of 5 November 2003 establishing the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
2004/5/EC, OJ L 003, 07/01/2004, p. 0028 – 0029.
301 Commission Decision of 23 January 2009 establishing the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Supervisors 2009/79/EC, OJ L 25, 29.1.2009, p. 28–32.
302 Commission Decision of 5 November 2003 amending Decision 2001/527/EC establishing the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators 2004/7/EC, OJ L 003, 07/01/2004 P. 0032 - 0032
303 Lamfalussy report, p. 24.
304 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing 
uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the 
framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 OJ L 225/1 30.7.2014 p. 1.
305 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee 
schemes OJ L 173/149 12.6.2014 p. 149-178.
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3.2.1 European Supervisory Authorities
There are three ESAs: The European Banking Authority,306 the European Securities and 
Markets Authority307 and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority.308 They 
function within the European System of Financial Supervision and in parallel with the ECB as 
prudential supervisor. Before discussing the functioning of the EBA, an examination of the legal 
basis of the ESAs is required. 
The ESAs establishing Regulations are based on Article 114 TFEU. This Article provides for 
the adoption of measures for the approximation of laws which have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market. The Court has held that, under Article 114 
TFEU, the EU legislature enjoys discretion in choosing the most appropriate harmonization 
technique,309 Accordingly, that Article can constitute a legal basis for the establishment of a 
Union body, such as an agency,310 provided that the tasks conferred on such a body are closely 
linked to the subject-matter of the acts approximating the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the MS.311
This is a change from the previous practise of establishment of agencies, as in the past 
the most common legal basis for the establishment of agencies was Article 352 TFEU (then Article 
308 TEC).312 This Article as well, provides for internal market harmonization measures, but 
specifically where the Treaty has not provided for the necessary powers. Because of this, a 
measure based on Article 352 TFEU requires unanimity in the Council and moreover, approval 
from the Parliaments of some MS.313 Therefore, it seems strategically better for the EU to base 
its measures on Article 114 TFEU. However, this did not go unnoticed by the MS, especially the 
UK, which challenged many of these measures. Most relevant for this thesis is the ESMA case.314
In this case, there were two main issues: firstly, whether Article 114 was the correct legal basis
and secondly, whether the body established through secondary EU law was Meroni-compliant.
306 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing 
a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and 
repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC OJ L 331/12 15.12.2010, p. 12.
307 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing 
a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84.
308 Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing 
a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision 
No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 48.
309 Case C-66/04 UK v European Parliament and Council [2005] EU:C:2005:743 (Smoke flavourings) para. 45-46.
310 Case C-217/04 UK v European Parliament and Council [2006] EU:C:2006:279 (ENISA) para. 62.
311 Ibid, para. 45.
312 Communication from the Commission - The operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies 
COM(2002) 718 final, p. 7.
313 See, UK European Union Act 2011, 2011 c. 12, part 1 section 8.
314 Case C‑ 270/12 UK v European Parliament and Council [2014] EU:C:2014:18 (ESMA).
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Regarding the first issue, the Court examined whether the two conditions of Article 114 
TFEU were fulfilled, namely whether the ESMA Regulation comprises measures for the 
approximation and whether it has as its object the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market. The UK contended that, if Article 28 ESMA Regulation provided for the adoption of 
individual measures directed at natural or legal persons, it is ultra vires Article 114 TFEU, because 
such individual measures cannot be regarded as harmonisation measures.315 The Court dismissed 
this claim by stating that even individual measures, if necessary, may constitute ‘measures for 
approximation’.316 However, the Court stressed that under Article 28 ESMA Regulation measures 
of general application are adopted as a rule, whereas individual measures under that Article can 
be adopted only ‘as a last resort and in very specific circumstances’.317 According to this, Article 
28 ESMA Regulation was found to be directed at the harmonisation of the Member States’ laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions. Furthermore, the Court established that, in 
accordance with recitals 2 and 33 in the preamble of the ESMA Regulation, the purpose of Article 
28 ESMA Regulation is to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market in the financial field.318 Thus, Article 28 ESMA Regulation is correctly based on 
Article 114 TFEU.
Regarding the second issue, the Court held that Article 28 is in accordance with the 
Meroni319 doctrine. The Court, however, seems to have deviated from one of the requirements 
of Meroni: the prohibition of delegation of discretionary powers. It stated that ESMA’s discretion 
was circumscribed, thereby implicitly suggesting that ESMA indeed possesses discretionary 
powers, however its use is controlled by Article 28(2) and (3).320 Moreover, in its conclusion the 
Court states that ESMA is not vested with a ‘very large measure of discretion’ that is incompatible 
with the FEU Treaty,321 thereby modifying the Meroni prohibition – from prohibition to delegate 
discretionary powers, to prohibition to delegate very large measure of discretion. The difference 
is obvious and substantial. This led some authors to consider the ESMA case as the Meroni 
doctrine revisited.322
The ESAs establishing Regulations also state that they comply with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.323 Indeed, as the crisis occurred notwithstanding the supervisory 
committees and the respective de Larosière recommendations, the supervisory objectives 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the MS.324 Furthermore, the ESAs can only adopt individual 
measures as a last resort, only when the national competent authority does not act or acts 
315 Ibid, para. 90.
316 Ibid, para. 106.
317 Ibid, para. 108.
318 Ibid, para. 114-116.
319 Case 9-56 Meroni [1958] EU:C:1958:7, para. 150-152
320 Case ESMA (n 314), para. 45.
321 Ibid, para.54.
322 P. Weismann, European Agencies and Risk Governance in EU Financial Market Law (Routledge, 2016) p.32.
323 Recital 66 of the respective Regulations establishing ESAs, see supra notes 306, 307, 308.
324 Article 5(3) TEU.
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improperly.325 Such ultima ratio powers comply with the requirement not to exceed what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives.326
The EBA, as the other ESAs, is a Union body with legal personality.327 It replaced the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors, as suggested in the de Larosière Report. Its tasks 
are, inter alia, to contribute to the establishment of high-quality common regulatory and 
supervisory standards and practices and to the consistent application of legally binding Union 
acts.328 The EBA does so, by adopting guidelines and recommendations, but also by submitting 
draft regulatory and implementing technical standards to the Commission, when the Commission 
has been delegated powers pursuant to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. The EBA also adopts 
guidelines addressed to the MS and national competent authorities, especially for areas 
regulated by a directive, for example the CRD.329 Such guidelines suggest the way in which the 
directive should be transposed on national level and are soft law i.e. not binding on the MS.
However, if the MS do not comply with the guidelines of the ECB, they need to state reasons why. 
This is known as the ‘comply or explain’ principle. 330 Nevertheless, most of the time the MS 
comply with the EBA guidelines and transpose the directives in the light of those guidelines.331
Apart from this, the EBA can conduct stress tests on European banks in order to identify 
systemic risk in the banking sector of the EU.332 The power of the EBA to adopt individual 
decisions addressed to financial institutions is limited only to the cases when national supervisors 
do not act in compliance with the decision of the EBA in the first place.333
The EBA functions in parallel with the ECB which is, as previously stated, the prudential 
supervisor for significant credit institutions. Unlike the ECB, the EBA has mostly powers to 
propose legislation and adopt non-binding technical standards, so the ECB and the EBA 
supplement each other in the field of banking supervision. Nevertheless, the far-reaching 
supervisory powers of the ECB may have led to the marginalisation of the EBA.334 This is 
problematic as the EBA is the only EU-wide authority in supervision and its marginalisation can 
increase the risk of fragmentation between the MS within the SSM and those outside of it.
325 Article 18 of the ESAs Regulation.
326 Article 5(4) TEU.
327 Article 5 EBA Regulation.
328 Ibid, Article 8.
329 For example, Guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management body and key 
function holders EBA/GL/2012/06, 22 November 2012
330 Article 16(3) EBA Regulation.
331 Compliance Table EBA/GL/2012/06, EBA BS 2012 215 Annex 1.
332 Article 23 EBA Regulation.
333 Article 17(6), Article 18(4) and Article 19(4) EBA Regulation. In this case, the Commission can also initiate 
proceedings against the MS under Article 258 TFEU.
334 E. Ferran and V. SG Babis, The European Single Supervisory Mechanism (2013) 13 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies p. 253–283.
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3.2.2 Single Resolution Board
The second pillar of the Banking Union, the single resolution mechanism, is regulated by 
the SRM Regulation. Before the adoption of the SRM Regulation, this pillar of the Banking Union 
was regulated by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.335 As any directive, the BRRD was 
applied in practice by the national resolution authorities, which commonly are the NCB of the 
MS. However, this Directive provided for minimum harmonization,336 which proved to be 
insufficient in times of crisis. The MS, by using the discretion that a directive leaves to them, 
transposed the BRRD differently in their national legal systems and because of this, the national 
resolution authorities were adopting substantially different decision. Because of such 
discrepancies in the resolution practices in the MS, there an unlevel-playing field was created
within the euro area.337
Another flaw of the BRRD was the complicated and ineffective system regarding cross-
border banking groups.338 Group recovery and resolution plans, under the BRRD, were reviewed, 
assessed and approved by joint decision of all group supervisors, in the absence of which the 
consolidating supervisor decides on consolidated basis, subject to referral to the EBA by other 
group supervisors.339 Because of this, the MS and the national resolution authorities were unable 
to cope with failing cross-border banks.340 This is also visible in the SRM Preamble.341
In order to correct these problems, the SRM Regulation was adopted only two months 
after the adoption of the BRRD. The SRM Regulation provided for a uniform procedure for 
resolution and most importantly, established the SRB. The SRB is a Union body with legal 
personality which applies the uniform resolution rules set out in the SRM Regulation and the 
BRRD. Its scope is the same as the SSM Regulation.342 According to this, the national resolution 
authorities still out the resolution procedure, but they do not enjoy the discretion that they used 
to have under the BRRD. Instead, they must act in accordance with the SRB decision.343 With this
any disparities in the resolution practices in the euro area were removed.344
335 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework 
for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 
82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 
2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190.
336 Ibid, recital 10 and 44.
337 Recitals 3 and 4 SRM Regulation.
338 V. SG Babis, European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive: Recovery Proceedings for Cross-Border Banking 
Groups in European Business Law Review 2014, p. 461.
339 Article 8 BRRD.
340 F. Allen Cross-Border Banking in Europe, CEPR (2011), point 1.3 p. 40.
341 Recital 10 SRM Regulation.
342 Recital 22 and Article 2 SRM Regulation.
343 Ibid, Article 18(9).
344 Ibid, recital 2.
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During the legislative process for the adoption of the SRM Regulation, the Commission 
considered that there is no need to conduct a new Impact Assessment. Therefore, in its Proposal 
for the SRM Regulation, it refers to the IA conducted for the adoption of the BRRD.345 This is 
rather unconvincing, as the SRM Regulation is the further step in the process of integration of 
the financial market and therefore, needs to be justified – the problem should be verified, its 
underlying cause should be identified, the need for EU action should be assessed and the 
advantages and disadvantages of available solutions analysed.346 In this regard, it is troubling 
that the Commission referred to old IA, when it proposed the SRM Regulation.
Like the ESAs, the SRB is also based on Article 114 TFEU. The Commission considered that 
this Article was the correct legal basis, as the SRM Regulation ‘aims to preserve the integrity and 
enhance the functioning of the internal market’.347 However, the SRB as a rule adopts individual 
measures and can only exceptionally adopt measures of general application. This is the exact 
opposite of the ESAs.348 Moreover, the SRM ‘adapts the rules and principles of [the BRRD] to the 
specificities of the SRM’.349 According to this, harmonization in the field of resolution of failing 
banks was carried out by the BRRD, and the SRM Regulation merely centralizes the said field. 
Because of this, the SRB can hardly be seen as a body ‘closely linked to the subject-matter of the 
acts approximating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States’.350
The analysis done in this thesis concerning ESMA, should apply equally to the SRB. Under 
Article 114 TFEU, there are two requirements: approximation measures and the functioning of 
the internal market. Regarding the former, the Court held in ESMA, that individual measures can 
exceptionally constitute measures for approximation of laws.351 Taking this into consideration, it 
is hard to see how the SRB, which normally takes individual decisions addressed at individual 
NCB, approximates the laws of the MS. Admittedly, centralisation and harmonisation are related 
terms, since harmonisation aims towards centralisation and unification.352 Nevertheless, the SRB 
does not seem to fit into the reasoning of the Court in the ESMA case.
On the other hand, the SRB seems to satisfy the second requirement. Indeed, it is 
indispensable for the Banking Union and improves the conditions in the internal market for 
345 Point 2 in Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules 
and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of 
a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council COM(2013) 520 final, 2013/0253 (COD) 10.7.2013.
346 See Commission’s Guidelines on Impact Assessment, as part of the Commission’s Better Regulation Initiative, 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/ug_chap3_en.htm (Accessed on 20.04.2017)
347 SRM Regulation Proposal, see supra note 345, point 3.1.
348 See p. 52 of this thesis.
349 Recital 18 SRM Regulation Preamble.
350 Case ENISA (n 310), para. 45.
351 Case ESMA (n 314), para. 106-108.
352 K. Lannoo and J. Casey, EU Financial Regulation & Supervision beyond 2005: An Agenda for the New 
Commission (CEPS, 2005) p. 9-10.
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financial services. The BRRD only provided for minimum harmonisation353 in the field of bank 
resolution, which proved to be insufficient in times of financial crisis. Further integration was 
required in the financial market, which necessarily meant creation of a centralised EU body 
responsible for bank resolution.
Article 18 SRM Regulation is the main article for the SRB, since it empowers it to adopt 
resolution schemes and lists the conditions for the use of that power. The purpose of this Article 
is to make the SRB Meroni/ESMA-compliant i.e. that the discretion of the SRB is controlled and 
circumscribed. For this reason, Article 18(1) SRM Regulation provides for three conditions, which 
need to be fulfilled, in order for the SRB to be able to act. They are assessed separately below.
Firstly, the entity should be failing or likely to fail. This is an objective assessment normally 
carried out by the ECB. It consists of evaluation of the assets and liabilities of the bank, taking 
into account its liquidity and future sustainability.354 However, this assessment can also be 
carried out by the SRB itself, subject to the condition that the ECB does not make such an 
assessment within three days of being informed by the SRB. This points to the fact that the SRB 
can itself initiate the resolution procedure, without being dependent on the ECB’s assessment. 
Secondly, there should be no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector 
measures or supervisory action would prevent the entity’s failure within a reasonable timeframe. 
This assessment is carried out by the SRB. In normal market circumstances, where bank failure is 
an “isolated incident”, this assessment would indeed be real and substantive. However, looking 
at the financial crisis, where markets did not trust the credit institutions and public confidence 
was undermined, it is highly unlikely that that the failure of any bank could be prevented by 
private sector measures. Therefore, at least while the consequences of the crisis are felt, this 
condition would remain to be automatic – as soon as a bank is ’failing or likely to fail’ no private 
sector measures would help. Thus, resolution would be the only choice.
Thirdly, the resolution should be necessary in the public interest. Resolution in the public 
interest is defined as necessary for the achievement of, and is proportionate to one or more of 
the resolution objectives. Again, this condition seems to be automatic – at least one of the 
resolution tools355 will almost always be the public interest, as it ensures the continuity of the 
bank and minimizes the adverse effects on the financial system. 
The Commission controls the fulfilment of these conditions, by receiving the resolution 
scheme by the SRB, immediately after it is adopted. The Commission can object to the 
discretionary aspects of the resolution scheme within 24 hours, and can propose to the Council 
353 V. SG Babis, European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive: Recovery Proceedings for Cross-Border Banking 
Groups in European Business Law Review 2014, p. 478.
354 Guidelines on common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory review and evaluation process 
(SREP) EBA/GL/2014/13, p.157. See also, Guidelines on the interpretation of the different circumstances when an 
institution shall be considered as failing or likely to fail under Article 32(6) of Directive 2014/59/EU 
EBA/GL/2015/07, p. 12.
355 Article 22 SRM Regulation.
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to object particularly to the ‘public interest’ requirement. This period of 24 hours may seem 
short, however resolution must be carried out swiftly to avoid market disturbances.356
According to this, Article 18 SRM Regulation circumscribes the discretion of the SRB only 
formally. In practice, the SRB can put a bank under resolution as soon as it declares that bank as 
failing or likely to fail. This seems to be insufficient for compliance with the Meroni/ESMA case-
law. If the fact that the SRB adopt mostly individual measures is added to this, it becomes even 
more troublesome to fit the SRB within the Meroni/ESMA framework. Because of this, even 
though the SRB improves the conditions in the financial market, the rule of law may nevertheless 
be undermined. 
3.3 The Court of Justice
The Court of Justice and the General Court play an important role in protecting the rule 
of law and fundamental rights in financial crisis. Unlike other EU institutions, which may consider 
the rule of law less important than saving the Union, the CJEU must always carefully assess the 
case both from the aspect of the institution and of the individual. In short, the CJEU cannot be 
affected by the crisis and take sides. Its task is seemingly simple – to ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.357
However, in times of financial crisis, this means that the CJEU has to balance on the one 
hand, the claims of the, at times, encroaching EU institutions, and on the other, the rights of the, 
at times, pretentious individuals. Therefore, it needs to be assessed how well has the CJEU 
fulfilled its task. Nevertheless, the CJEU has a role to play even before getting to the substance 
of the case, by declaring the case admissible or inadmissible. In accordance with this, this last 
point is divided into two parts: access to justice and substance.
A) Access to justice
Rules on admissibility in the EU judicial system are subject to constant debate.358 That 
debate is however, outside of the scope of this thesis. Presently the rules on standing are 
interpreted strictly and in accordance with text of the respective TFEU articles. In this regard, the 
Court has held on several occasions that the TFEU has established by Articles 263 and 277, on the 
one hand, and Article 267, on the other, a complete system of legal remedies.359
356 Moreover, it is preferred that resolution is carried out during the weekend, see The Bank of England’s approach 
to resolution (2014) p. 16. 
357 Article 19 TEU.
358 C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] EU:C:2002:462, para.44. On the other hand see, Opinion of AG 
Jacobs in the same case, para. 100-106.
359 Ibid, para 40. See also, Case C-461/03 Gaston Schul [2005] EU:C:2005:742, para. 22; Case C‑ 72/15 Rosneft
[2017] EU:C:2017:236, para. 66.
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Through Article 263 TFEU a person can institute proceedings against an act addressed to 
that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them. In accordance with the Lisbon 
Treaty amendments, a person needs to show only direct concern against a regulatory act that 
does not entail implementing measures. Contrary to this, the MS can always challenge the validity 
of an EU measure. The time-limit for this action is two months from the publication of the 
measure, or from its notification to the plaintiff. Article 263 TFEU establishes a direct action for 
annulment of an EU measure, however, its strict conditions sometimes prevent individuals from 
relying on this Article.
The Lisbon Amendments were not very efficient as they were interpreted narrowly. In 
this regard, a regulatory act is an act of general application other than legislative act.360 The term 
implementing measures is, on the other hand interpreted broadly, thereby narrowing the scope 
of the Lisbon exception.361 Even more, most, if not all, of the crisis measures are taken in the
form of legislative acts or individual decisions. Therefore, individuals could not benefit from this 
exception in the light of the financial crisis. They have to show direct and individual concern.
Direct effect requires that the legal situation of the individual is directly affected and leaves no 
discretion to the addressee,362 whereas individual concern requires the individual to be 
distinguished by reason of his attributes as if he was the addressee.363 The rules on standing are 
generally stringent, however their fulfilment is particularly hard when it comes to measures 
affecting the financial sector.
As seen in the Alcimos case,364 an ECB decision to prohibit an increase in ELA was found 
not to be of direct concern for the applicant. The applicant failed to prove that the ECB decision 
left no discretion to the Bank of Greece, by failing to prove the causal link between the ECB 
decision and the Bank of Greece decision to impose bank holiday and capital controls, from which 
the applicant supposedly suffered damages. The General Court held that the ECB decision left 
discretion to the addressee, as the Bank of Greece was free to choose measures different from 
the bank holiday and capital controls365 and swiftly dismissed the applicant’s claim that that 
discretion was ‘purely hypothetical’.366 Thus, the action was dismissed as inadmissible, without 
even getting to the assessment of individual concern, which is generally harder to prove than 
direct concern.
According to this, the demanding rules on standing may constitute an obstacle for access 
to justice. Apart from admissibility, the substance of the Alcimos case was very intriguing, as it 
opened the question of separation of monetary and supervisory tasks of the ECB, the 
360 Case C‑ 583/11 P Inuit [2013] EU:C:2013:625, para. 58.
361 Case C‑ 274/12 P Telefónica SA [2013] EU:C:2013:852, para. 35.
362 Joined cases 41 to 44-70 International Fruit [1971] EU:C:1971:53, para. 25-28.
363 C-25/62 Plaumann [1963] EU:C:1963:17, p. 107.
364 Case T‑ 368/15 Alcimos [2016] EU:T:2016:438, para. 40.
365 Ibid, para. 38.
366 Ibid, para. 37.
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independence of the ECB and the scope of Article 14.4 ESCB Statute.367 Unfortunately, the 
General Court did not go into the substance of the case.
Through Article 277 TFEU, also known as the plea of illegality, an individual may, while 
challenging the validity of an individual measure affecting him, simultaneously challenge the 
legality of the act of general application upon which the individual measure is based. However, a 
precise definition of the plea of illegality cannot be given, as the Court’s case-law concerning this 
Article is somewhat unclear and inconsistent. Firstly, the Court held that the plea of illegality 
constitutes a general principle of law.368 It provides the persons ‘who are precluded by the second 
paragraph of [Article 263] from instituting proceedings directly in respect of general acts, with 
the benefit of a judicial review of them at the time when they are affected by implementing 
decisions which are of direct and individual concern to them’.369
Secondly, in accordance with this definition, the most common use of the plea of illegality 
is as an additional and incidental plea during an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU.370
In this regard, once the applicant initiates an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, it can 
use the plea of illegality before the Court, in support of his claim to annul the contested individual 
measure.371 This means that Article 277 TFEU cannot be used independently and cannot in itself 
bring a person before the Court.372
Thirdly, the text of Article 277 TFEU uses the term ‘inapplicability of that act’. Strict textual 
interpretation would mean that the effects of a successful plea of illegality are a declaration of 
the inapplicability of the general act and the annulment of the individual decision due to the 
illegality of its legal basis.373 However, the Court also uses the term ‘invalidity’ in regard to Article 
277 TFEU,374 which would mean that the effect of the plea of illegality is similar to that of the 
action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU. Because of this uncertainty surrounding Article 277, 
it was not used in the cases during the financial crisis, nevertheless, it could be potentially helpful 
especially for persons seeking to annul a supervisory decision of the ECB based on the SSM 
Regulation, which seems to have many flaws.375
367 Application for initiating proceedings between Alcimos and the ECB http://www.alcimos.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/ECJ_filing.pdf (Accessed on 20.04.2017)
368 Case 9/56 Meroni [1958] EU:C:1958:7, p. 140; Case 216/82 Universität Hamburg [1983] EU:C:1983:248, para.10.
369 Case 92/78 Simmenthal [1979] EU:C:1979:53, para. 41.
370 Craig and G. de Burca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford, 2015) p. 540.
371 Case Inuit (n 360), para. 93.
372 However, see case Universität Hamburg (n 368), para. 12 where the Court allowed Article 277 TFEU to be used 
before a national court, and the applicant was enabled to indirectly challenge a measure after the two months’ 
time-limit under Article 263(6) TFEU had passed.
373 D. Sinaniotis, The Plea of Illegality in EC Law (2001) in European Public Law 7, p. 122. See also, Case 543/79 
Anton Birke [1981] para. 24 and Case C‑ 21/14 P Commission v Rusal Armenal [2015] EU:C:2015:494, para. 31.
374 Case C‑ 343/09 Afton Chemical [2010] EU:C:2010:419, para. 18; Also, Case C‑ 59/11 Kokopelli [2012] 
EU:C:2012:447, para. 34.
375 See point 2.3.2 of this thesis.
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Through Article 267 TFEU, a national court can refer a question to the Court of Justice, 
relating to the interpretation of primary EU law or the interpretation and validity of secondary 
EU law. It is arguable whether the preliminary reference procedure can be considered a judicial 
remedy, because the applicant cannot by itself decide to make a reference and further, this 
procedure differs from direct challenges under Article 263 TFEU as to the participation of the 
institutions, the delays and costs involved, the award of interim measures or the possibility of 
third party intervention.376 Irrelevant of whether the preliminary ruling is a legal remedy or not, 
the majority of the cases mentioned in this thesis are indeed preliminary ruling procedures. In 
this regard, Article 267 TFEU has proved beneficial for ensuring the rule of law in times of crisis.
According to the Court, Article 267 TFEU is part of the complete system of legal remedies. 
In support of this view of the Court, Article 267(3) TFEU states that when national courts against 
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law hear cases involving EU law, they
must refer the question to the Court. However, this obligation is not absolute. According to the 
acte clair377 and acte éclairé378 doctrine even national courts against whose decisions there is no 
judicial remedy may refuse to refer the question to the Court. Also, those courts may consider 
that the question is irrelevant to the dispute before it and decide not to refer it to the Court.379
Concerning this, the ECtHR has held that in accordance with the right to a fair trial, as enshrined 
in Article 6 ECHR, national courts whose decisions were not open to appeal under domestic law 
are required to give reasons for their refusal to refer a preliminary question to the Court.380
Therefore, it seems that most of the time national courts will refer the question to the Court, if a 
party in the proceedings requests so. 
But even after the national court makes the preliminary reference to the Court, the Court 
may declare it inadmissible for a number of reasons, most importantly if it considers the question 
referred not relevant to the resolution of the dispute.381 However, this is unlikely since all the 
question referred through Article 267 TFEU enjoy a presumption of relevance.382 In this regard, 
the Court in the Gauweiler case383 considered a request for preliminary ruling admissible, 
notwithstanding the claims of several MS and EU institutions that the press-release and the OMT 
decision is preparatory and does not have legal effects.384 Indeed, the Court held in IBM,385 that 
376 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-50/00 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] EU:C:2002:197, p. 102.
377 When the issue in question is so clear that no reference is required. See Case C-283/81 CILFIT [1982] 
EU:C:1982:335, para. 16-21.
378 When the Court has ruled previously on the issue in question. See Joined Cases 28, 29 and 30/62 Da Costa 
[1963] EU:C:1963:6, p. 38.
379 Case CILFIT (n 377), para. 21.
380 ECtHR Judgment of 8/4/2014 – 17120/09 Dhahbi v. Italy, para. 31-34.
381 Case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries [1994] EU:C:1994:195, paras 14-15. See also, Case C-83/91 Meilicke [1992] 
EU:C:1992:332, paras 28-29; Case C-309/06 Marks & Spencer [2008] EU:C:2008:211, para 21.
382 Case C‑ 416/10 Križan [2013] EU:C:2013:8, para. 54. Also, Case C‑ 76/15 Vervloet [2016] EU:C:2016:975, para. 
57.
383 Case Gauweiler (n 254).
384 Ibid, para. 23.
385 Case 60/81 International Business Machines Corporation [1981] EU:C:1981:264, para. 9-12.
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a provisional decision paving the way for the final decision cannot be reviewed by the CJEU. The 
Court, however, dismissed such claims on the basis of ‘preventive legal protection’386 and the 
existence of a dispute in the BVerfG, which made an Article 267 TFEU request for the first time.
In reality, the substance of the Gauweiler case seemed too important to be declared inadmissible. 
Part 2.3.4 of this thesis deals with the substance of this case. For the purposes of this part, it is 
sufficient to show that individuals, unlike MS, may be denied access to justice because of 
stringent rules on admissibility. 
It was held as early as 1963 that subjects of the Union are not only MS, but also their 
nationals.387 However, when it comes to admissibility the treatment of individuals differs from 
that of MS. This is especially true in the financial crisis when the EU measures per se affect an 
open and unspecified group of individuals. Thus, the only way to get before the Court seems to 
be indirectly through the MS – either through the courts, which can submit a request for 
preliminary ruling in accordance with Article 267 TFEU or through the governments, which are 
“privileged applicants” in accordance with Article 263(2) TFEU. 
B) Substance
When the actions fulfilled the admissibility requirements, the Court went on to assess the 
substance of those actions. Among the many cases brought during the financial crisis, most 
relevant for this thesis are Pringle,388 Ledra,389 Mallis,390 and Kotnik.391 In addition to these cases, 
a reference is made to Gauweiler,392 ESMA393 and OLAF,394 which have been examined in detail 
in other parts of this thesis.
Firstly, the Pringle case was discussed in part 2.3.3 of this thesis. Here, an analysis is made 
regarding the compliance of the ESM with Article 123 and 125 TFEU. Article 123 TFEU contains a 
prohibition on monetary financing, which means that the ECB and the NCB cannot grant overdraft 
facilities to the MS or the EU. This prohibition includes the direct purchase of EU or government 
debt instruments by the ECB of the NCB. The question in Pringle was whether the ESM Treaty 
circumvents this prohibition, as the ESM, in which the ECB also participates, can buy government 
bonds. The Court held that Article 123 TFEU is not addressed to the MS, therefore this Article 
does not prohibit them from granting financial assistance one to another. In this regard, there is 
another argument that supports the Court’s conclusion. As stated at page 37 of this thesis, the 
capital of the ESM is composed of paid-in capital of the MS and it is the MS that formally make 
the decision, in the ESM Board of Governors, to purchase government bonds. Therefore, even 
386 Case Gauweiler (n 254), para. 27.
387 Case 26-62 van Gend & Loos [1963] EU:C:1963:1, p. 12.
388 Case Pringle (n 218).
389 Case Ledra (n 183).
390 Joined Cases C‑ 105/15 P to C‑ 109/15 P Mallis and Others v Commission and ECB [2016] EU:C:2016:702.
391 Case Kotnik (n 286).
392 Case Gauweiler (n 254).
393 Case ESMA (n 314).
394 Case OLAF (n 17).
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though the ECB plays a role in the ESM, its actions cannot be seen as contrary to the monetary 
financing prohibition in Article 123 TFEU.
The more substantial question is whether the ESM Treaty is in breach of Article 125 TFEU, 
which contains the ‘no-bailout clause’. In the beginning, the Court relied on textual interpretation
and concluded that Article 125 TFEU did not prohibit every form of financial assistance between 
the MS.395 Next, by relying on the teleological interpretation, it concluded that the objective of 
Article 125 TFEU is to ensure that the MS follow a sound budgetary policy, thus financial 
assistance that does not endanger this objective is not prohibited.396 The Court continued by 
stating that the ESM does not assume the debts of the recipient Member State, instead it gives a 
credit to the MS, which the MS is supposed to repay and which is subject to strict 
conditionality.397
The most troubling part seems to be Article 25(2) ESM Treaty. This Article states that a 
failure of a ESM MS to meet the required payment under a capital call, leads to a revised 
increased capital call, in order for the other ESM MS to cover for such failure. Thus, the ESM MS 
are to pay extra, so that the ESM receives the total amount of capital needed. This is exactly 
opposite of Article 125 TFEU, as it means that other MS assume the obligations of a defaulting 
MS. The Court saw the justification for this in Article 25(3) ESM Treaty, according to which when 
the ESM MS eventually pays its debt to the ESM, the excess capital is returned to the other MS. 
Therefore, the Court considered that it is ultimately the MS that is responsible for its own 
commitments, even though temporarily the other MS may cover its debts.398
This reasoning is virtually on the verge of Article 125 TFEU. The text of this Article does 
not refer to the temporary nature of the liability of other MS for the debts of a defaulting MS.
This no-bailout clause is a constitutional principle, which is a manifestation, a corollary of the 
fiscal sovereignty of the MS.399 To put it simply, the MS have the right to define their fiscal policy 
on their own, but they also have the obligation to bear the consequences of that fiscal policy on 
their own. If this right is modified, it will have repercussions on the obligation, and vice versa. The 
MS, with the creation of the ESM, seem to have modified the obligation, by de facto assuming 
the obligations of a defaulting MS. Because of this, the MoU interferes with the fiscal policy of 
the MS. The Court seems to accept such trade-off and frames it legally in the Pringle case, by 
weakening the prohibition in Article 125 TFEU.
Moreover, the Court in Pringle held that the provisions of the Charter do not apply to the 
MS in the ESM, as in accordance with Article 51(1) Charter, the MS are not implementing EU law 
when they act within the ESM.400 Consequently, the MS do not have to comply with the Charter 
395 Case Pringle (n 218), para. 130-132.
396 Ibid, para. 135-137.
397 Ibid, para. 142-143.
398 Ibid, para. 144-145.
399 K. Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2015) p. 181.
400 Case Pringle (n 218), para. 180.
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when acting pursuant to the ESM Treaty. This left open the question whether the Charter applies 
to EU institutions when they act within the ESM framework.401
This question came up before the Court in the Ledra case. The case concerned the Union’s 
non-contractual liability for the alleged infringement of the right to property of the appellants, 
as enshrined in Article 17 Charter. The Court first held that the Charter applies to the EU 
institutions, even when they act outside of the EU legal framework, unlike the MS. Therefore, the 
Court then conducted the proportionality test, in order to assess whether the Commission, by 
concluding a MoU with Cyprus, contributed to a sufficiently serious breach of the appellants’ 
right to property.  The Court found that bail-in tool prescribed in the MoU, is both appropriate 
and necessary for the achievement of the legitimate aim of ensuring the stability of the banking 
system in the euro area. This was supported by the negative spill-over effect, which demands to 
act swiftly,402 and the specificities of the bail-in tool, which did not exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the objective.403 Therefore, the Union cannot be held liable for the losses of the 
appellants.
The Court reached the same outcome, however with different reasoning, in the Mallis 
case, which was delivered on the same day as Ledra. The appellants in the Mallis case sought the 
annulment of an Eurogroup statement which allegedly led to the bail-in of their deposits. The 
Court held that, even though the ECB and the Commission participate in the meetings of the 
Eurogroup, the Eurogroup’s statement cannot be seen as an expression of the decision-making 
power of those two EU institutions.404 Therefore, there can be no causal link between the 
Eurogroup statement and the bail-in of the appellants’ deposits. 
In the Kotnik case, the Court held that the burden-sharing measures i.e. bail-in of deposits, 
provided for in point 40 to 46 of the Banking Communication as a precondition for authorisation 
of State Aid, are compatible with the right to property. The Court held firstly, that the Banking 
Communication is not binding on the MS,405 and as a consequence of this it does not impose any 
obligation on the MS regarding the form or procedure for the adoption of the burden-sharing 
measures.406 In this regard, the requirement of bailing-in the deposits of the subordinated 
creditors was the most troublesome for the applicants. The Court found that this requirement is 
justified as subordinated creditors are to contribute to the bail-in only if there is further need of 
financing after the bank’s shareholders and only if there are no other possibilities available to 
overcome any capital shortfall in the bank. Moreover, the ‘no creditor worse off principle’ 
enshrined in point 46 of the Banking Communication, requires that subordinated creditors should 
401 A. Hinarejos, Institutional Responses to the Crisis p.12 in A. Hinarejos, The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional
Perspective (Oxford, 2015).
402 Case Ledra (n 183), para. 72.
403 Ibid, para. 73-74.
404 Case Mallis (n 390), para. 57.
405 Case Kotnik (n 286), para. 45.
406 Ibid, para. 72.
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therefore not receive less, in economic terms, than what their instrument would have been 
worth if no State aid were to be granted.407
Indeed, the Banking Communication leaves discretion to the MS in choosing the form of 
burden-sharing measures. Nevertheless, if the MS choses to impose a mandatory bail-in, the 
Banking Communication provides for sufficient safeguards. Therefore, the right to property as 
enshrined in Article 17 Charter, does not preclude the burden-sharing measures in the Banking 
Communication.
To sum up, the role of the CJEU in times of crisis is crucial. The CJEU is the last stop for the 
protection of the principle of rule of law and fundamental rights in the EU. The MS had two 
choices in the face of the crisis: to further integrate or to test the strength of the existing 
integration. They evidently chose the former. In this regard, the CJEU has overall fulfilled its task 
well, even though on some occasions it was influenced by the crisis and tried to support the MS 
and the EU institutions in their integration efforts or at least not to impede such efforts. 
Considering that the crisis measures are slowly showing the desired result, it seems that the Court 
has rightly protected many of those measures against the numerous claims. However, it is a fact 
that the Court through its judgments has affected the future functioning of the EU and only time 
will tell if it is for the better.
407 Ibid, para. 77.
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4. Final observations
This thesis assessed and critically analysed the current state of the principle of rule of law 
in the EU. For this reason, many legal as well as academic texts were presented and discussed. 
As a result of such analysis, various statements for the present situation in EU law were made,
but also claims and views for the future were presented. For the purposes of clarity and 
conciseness, they are summarised in the first point of this last chapter of the thesis. 
Nevertheless, the circumstances under which the EU is functioning are constantly 
changing. Therefore, it is particularly hard during or shortly after a crisis, to assess the law, as it 
is constantly evolving. This is all the more true when it comes to EU law.408 Because of this, a 
frequent re-examination and reassessment of any analysis is warranted, as new developments 
need to be taken into account and evaluated accordingly.409 However, it is impossible to do so in 
one thesis. What is possible is to include the likely future challenges that the EU will face and to 
propose suggestions de lege ferenda which could provide for better functioning of the EU. This is 
done in the second point of this last chapter of the thesis.
4.1 Conclusion
Many of the measures relating to the financial sector have relied on the will and the self-
discipline of the MS. The financial crisis proved that the Union had too much trust in the MS and 
was even ignorant to the detrimental negative consequences of a possible crisis. Because of this, 
the financial crisis has caught the EU and its institutions unprepared and almost resulted in the 
collapse of the system which was built steadily over the years. Even though the EU reacted as 
soon as the first signs of a global financial crisis were visible in 2008, that reaction was 
nevertheless overdue, insufficient and accompanied by panic. Partly to blame for such approach 
are the biggest MS, Germany and France, which avoided further financial integration until the 
very existence of the EMU was called into question by the crisis.410
As every belated reaction, this one too came at a higher price. It was impossible to
continue with the patient and piecemeal integration in the internal market for financial services.
Such integration requires time and resources, in order to examine the market circumstances, 
assess the need for EU action and analyse the advantages and disadvantages of every available 
solution. Since the beginning of the crisis, both time and resources were lacking. Therefore, the 
408 P. G. Teixeira, The Regulation of the European Financial Market after the Crisis in P. D. Posta and L. S. Talani
(eds.), Europe and the Financial Crisis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 20
409 Y. A. Monogios and P. G. Korliras, Debt Sustainability Revisited in P. Arestis and M. Sawyer (eds.), The Euro Crisis
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 80.
410 Franco-German Declaration, Statement for the France-Germany-Russia Summit, 18.10.2010.
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EU institutions had basically no choice – they had to act swiftly and vigorously to save the euro 
and the Union. Any other approach could potentially have devastating consequences. This was 
indeed what the EU institutions did.411
The EMU and the Banking Union as they exist today, are a result of the financial crisis. In 
this regard, it can hardly be maintained that the crisis, regardless of its severe consequences, was 
beneficial to the EU because it provided for deeper integration. Deeper financial integration was 
inevitable and it would have come even without the crisis.412 The crisis has only accelerated this 
process, at the expense of the rule of law. As seen in the main part, the main EU institution in the 
EMU is the ECB, whereas the Banking Union is composed of the SSM, the SRM and the DGS.
The EMU today differs significantly from the EMU before the crisis. The most substantive 
change is the role of the ECB, which became not only the most influential institution in the EMU, 
but also in the whole Union. This is because the ECB is active in different fields. Firstly, it defines 
the monetary policy of the EU. Initially, this was the only task of the ECB and it was interpreted 
narrowly. However, in addition to receiving new tasks, the monetary tasks and powers of the ECB 
also evolved through the years. The moment when the Court officially sanctioned the expanded 
mandate of the ECB was the Gauweiler case. The Court held that the ECB has a mandate not only 
to define the monetary policy of the EU by setting the official interest rate, but also to intervene 
in any part of the transmission mechanism. In this way, the buying of bonds on the secondary 
market by the ECB was seen as falling within the mandate of the ECB. This broad interpretation 
of the mandate of the ECB will inevitably have an impact of the functioning of the EMU in the 
future. 
Moreover, the ECB plays a role in the economic policy, through the ESM. Even though the 
ECB does not have decision-making powers in the ESM, it is very influential as being part of the 
Troika. The ECB is responsible for, inter alia, assessing the request for financial support and 
negotiating a MoU. By being part of such a process, the ECB can de facto influence the economic 
policy of a MS i.e. adjust the macroeconomic structure of the MS. Before the crisis, the 
interference of EU institutions with the economic policy of the MS was practically unthinkable. 
The ECB is a powerful party in the negotiation process, as it has at its disposal monetary 
instruments such as stalling the ELA. Such a practise is prohibited under the Treaties as it amounts 
to misuse of power, however it can rarely be proved in court proceedings. 
Lastly, the ECB has supervisory powers in the SSM. This mechanism is flawed both in 
procedure and in substance. Procedurally, the supervisory decision-making process in the ECB is 
at odds with primary EU law. There is no exception in the ESCB Statute regarding the adoption of 
411 European Council Report, Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union, 5.12.2012.
412 The EMU was established in accordance with the ‘monetarist’ approach. Economic convergence was to follow 
the successful monetary convergence, see p. 22 of this thesis.
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supervisory decisions. This means that the adoption of supervisory decisions, according to the 
ESCB Statute, falls under the general rule of adoption by simple majority. However, according to 
the SSM Regulation the supervisory decisions of the ECB are adopted by ‘reverse majority’ voting. 
Through this adoption procedure, a supervisory decision can be adopted even without voting in 
the ECB Governing Council. Admittedly, it is unlikely that a draft supervisory decision will be 
omitted from the agenda of the ECB Governing Council, so it seems that in practise this body will 
always vote for or against a supervisory decision. Nevertheless, any inconsistency between 
primary and secondary EU law is a threat to the rule of law.413
Substantively, the most troubling aspect of the SSM is the different treatment of banks, 
which goes contrary to the very purpose of the SSM. This stems from the questionable way in 
which the ECB was given the power to apply national law, in addition to EU law. This is an 
unprecedented situation in EU law, and because of this it requires attention and careful 
regulation. Instead, the SSM Regulation gives the ECB the power to apply national law 
transposing relevant directives in one single paragraph, without further adjustments or 
clarifications. What can the ECB do when there is no national transposing law? Is the ECB bound 
to apply national law which improperly transposes a directive? Who can review the ECB decisions 
based purely on national law? These questions are left unanswered by the EU legislator, so it is 
up to academic literature, including this thesis, to offer views and solutions. Because of this, 
there is uncertainty regarding what the ECB can and cannot do on behalf of the SSM, which 
weakens the rule of law.
Moreover, the creation of the Supervisory Board within the ECB and the adoption of 
supervisory decisions by the ECB Governing Council can interfere with the independence of the 
ECB, which is protected by the TFEU. According to primary EU law, the ECB carries out its tasks
independently from the MS and from the EU institutions. The independence of the ECB is given 
constitutional character, because it is essential for a successful fulfilment of monetary objectives.
However, when other tasks are conferred upon the ECB, they necessarily influence the 
implementation of monetary policy. It is legally and practically impossible to make the ECB 
independent from itself. On the other hand, it is legally possible, but nevertheless practically 
impossible to separate one internal ECB body from another, or moreover to distinguish two 
separate “egos” of the ECB Governing Council. In addition to supervisory tasks, the ECB is given 
tasks within the ESM, which further undermines its independence. The ECB has exceeded its 
initial narrow mandate and has correspondingly reduced its independence in monetary policy. 
The ECB today is a pale imitation of the 1998 ordoliberal ECB, or better said, a paramount version 
of the original ECB.
413 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A new EU Framework to 
strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014) 158 final/2, p. 4.
F i n a l o b s e r v a t i o n s | 68
Lastly, the conferral of supervisory tasks and powers to the ECB, in addition to the broad 
discretion in monetary policy and the involvement in the ESM, gives the ECB a broad spectrum 
of instruments for achieving its objectives. This high concentration of powers in the hands of the 
ECB significantly increases the likelihood of misuse of power. Misuse of power is prohibited under 
the Treaties, nevertheless claims of misuse of power are very rarely upheld by the Court. This is
because of the high burden of proof, which includes proving the subjective intent of the 
institution in question. Considering the detrimental effects of the financial crisis, the Court is even 
less likely to uphold claims of misuse of power. Therefore, the rule of law concern is obvious.
The SRM also has flaws both in the procedure in which it was created and in its substance. 
During the creation of the SRM, the Commission relied on the IA carried out for the purposes of 
the BRRD. The system established under the SRM Regulation differs substantially from the BRRD, 
because it is centralised on EU level. In this regard, the SRM Regulation is likely to have a 
significant economic impact, which according to the Commission itself, is a sufficient reason for 
conducting an IA.414 More importantly, the main decision-making body in the SRM - the SRB, is 
at odds with the Meroni doctrine. The conditions for conferring powers on agencies were already 
broadened in the ESMA case, however the SRB does not seem to satisfy even those conditions. 
Article 18 SRM Regulation prescribes three conditions, however in reality they can be fulfilled as 
soon as a bank is considered ‘failing or likely to fail’. This is insufficient, since it does not at all 
circumscribe the discretion of the SRB.
Also, there are problems with Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for the SRM Regulation. 
This Article requires the measure in question to be for the approximation of laws and have as its 
object the functioning of the internal market. Even though the latter seems to be fulfilled, it is 
difficult to see how the measures of the SRB approximate the laws in the EU. There is an essential 
difference between the SRB and the other agencies established under Article 114 TFEU. The SRB 
is a resolution authority and adopts individual decisions containing resolution schemes, whereas 
ESMA, EBA and other EU agencies are regulatory authorities which adopt general measures 
containing technical standards. What is more, the SRB is subject to these technical standards
adopted by other EU agencies.415 Because of this, the SRB should have been established under 
Article 352 TFEU, instead of Article 114 TFEU. Nevertheless, this would have been troublesome
as Article 352 TFEU requires unanimity in the Council, but Sweden and the UK did not support 
the funding of the SRB, which is one of the fundamental elements of this agency.416
A possible challenge of the legal basis of the SRM Regulation before the CJEU can have 
two outcomes. The Court may increase the scope of application of Article 114 TFEU, similarly as 
414 Commission’s Guidelines on Impact Assessment, see supra note 346.
415 See inter allia, Article 5(2) SRM Regulation.
416 European Commission Statement 14/165, regarding the IGA on the Single Resolution Fund, 21.5.2014.
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in the ESMA case,417 so that the establishment of the SRB is justified. On the other hand, the 
Court may consider the SRM Regulation incorrectly based on Article 114 TFEU, similarly as in the 
Tobacco Advertising case.418 This second outcome seems to be more in favour of the principle of 
rule of law. Nevertheless, the UK as a kind of EU Agency-vigilante, presently has more pressing 
issues to deal with, instead of the legal basis of the SRB. Because of this, it may take some time 
before the question of validity of the SRM Regulation comes up before the Court. 
Lastly, the DGS has not been particularly analysed in this thesis. This is because the DGS 
remained at national level during the crisis. This field is harmonized through a directive, which 
requires deposits up to 100 000 euro to be guaranteed at national level. It is worth mentioning 
that there is Commission’s proposal419 for a Regulation establishing a European Deposit 
Insurance Fund, which would be composed of the national DGS in the euro area. Since this
Regulation is still in legislative procedure, it and other future challenges for the EU are going to 
be assessed in the next point.
4.2 De lege ferenda: Future challenges and suggestions
Even though the negative effects of the financial crisis are fading, there are is still much 
room for improvement in the EMU and the Banking Union. It seems that presently, when the 
crisis is coming to an end, is a good time to analyse the measures taken during the crisis. This is 
because many of the crisis measures had as their primary objective not to improve the EU, but 
instead to save the EU. The effectiveness of such crisis measures cannot be disputed, 
nevertheless the reality is that presently the EMU and the Banking Union are far from perfect.
The ECB is currently a very powerful institution. While this thesis is against revoking the 
powers that the ECB already has, it supports an increased control and accountability of those 
powers. Firstly, the conventional monetary functions of the ECB i.e. setting the official interest 
rate and controlling the supply of money in the euro zone, should continue to be carried out 
independently, in accordance with the primary EU law. On the other hand, the unconventional 
monetary functions of the ECB i.e. bond buying and lending in last resort, should be subject to a 
stricter proportionality test, unlike currently where the Court applies the same standard of 
review for both conventional and unconventional monetary functions.420 In this way, the ECB 
would have to carry out a more accurate and careful analysis when using unconventional 
417 Case ESMA (n 314), para. 117.
418 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] EU:C:2000:544, para. 118.
419 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in 
order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme
420 For the distinction between conventional and unconventional monetary policy, see Keynote lecture at the 
International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies by L. Smaghi, Member of the ECB Executive Board, 
28.4.2009 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090428.en.html (Accessed on 09.05.2017)
F i n a l  o b s e r v a t i o n s | 70
monetary instruments. This is because unconventional instruments should be used if no other 
possibility exists.
Secondly, when it comes to prudential supervision, the biggest problem is the uncertainty 
regarding the powers of the ECB to apply national law. It is possible that this is settled through 
the case-law of the Court, otherwise that can be done through an amendment of the SSM 
Regulation. Such an amendment can also correct the discrepancy between the ESCB Statute and 
the SSM Regulation regarding the adoption of supervisory decisions. There is also space for 
improvement of the accountability and transparency of banking supervision. Unlike monetary 
policy, prudential supervision needs to be close to the banks and the banks must be aware of the 
requirements and obligations.421
Thirdly, the activities of the ECB in the ESM must be separated from the monetary and 
supervisory activities of the ECB. In this regard, the practice of the ECB to make national ELA 
conditional upon signing a MoU within the ESM is problematic. The ECB when stalling ELA should 
only take into consideration monetary issues, namely preserving the price stability. This can only 
be achieved if the Court examines carefully the reasons for the actions of the ECB. It may sound 
simple – monetary instruments should be used for monetary objectives, whereas supervisory 
instruments for supervisory objectives, however in reality it is a difficult task to ascertain this and 
requires the Court to examine the background of the case more carefully than it does presently. 
Nevertheless, a less permissive Court is crucial for preserving the rule of law in a situation in 
which the ECB has broad discretion and an array of available instruments and powers at its 
disposal in different fields of the EMU and the Banking Union. Also in this regard, the repeated 
demands of the Parliament for integration of the ESM into the EU framework and its 
accountability are welcomed and should be acknowledged by the Commission.422
The European Commission should continue to closely monitor the financial situation in 
the MS and the internal market and act accordingly. Firstly, the Crisis Communications should be 
adjusted or revoked once market conditions improve, and they are indeed improving as the 
statistics show. It is important not to forget that those Communications are extraordinary and 
temporary measures that can harm the internal market by distorting competition. The 
Communications are now more than five years applicable and in those five years many things 
have changed, therefore the Commission should as soon as possible assess the need for such 
crisis measures.
Secondly, the Commission should continue with its efforts to harmonize the internal 
market for financial services. However, it should also consider the political and economic 
421 This is recognized by the ECB Supervisory Board, see Introductory statement to the press conference on the ECB 
Annual Report on supervisory activities 2015 by D. Nouy, 23 March 2016
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2016/html/se160323.en.html (Accessed on 
20.05.2017)
422 European Parliament resolution on strengthening European democracy in the future EMU, 2013/2672(RSP) 
10.06.2013, point 10.
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situation in the Union. Currently, the main task of the Commission in the financial market is 
establishing the EDIS and its Fund. In this regard, it must be noted that the legislative procedure 
for the EDIS is slower than the procedure for the SSM and the SRM. The EDIS proposal comes at 
a sensitive time with political elections and instability, therefore it may be wise not to urge for 
further centralisation at EU level. Also, the two other pillars of the Banking Union can be 
improved, so it is more reasonable to deal with them, instead of building further on a faulty basis. 
Thirdly, regarding the establishment of EU agencies, the Commission should not view
Article 114 TFEU as an ‘Article 352 TFEU minus the unanimity’. Even though the Court supports 
this view as seen by the agency case-law, the MS are eventually left with a feeling that their will 
is circumvented and it is questionable how longer they can tolerate it. Therefore, in the future, 
EU agencies should be based on Article 352 TFEU, as they used to be before the crisis. It is 
undeniable that those agencies provided for the smooth resolution of the crisis, however a 
democratic system is more about the will of its constituents than about the success of the
outcome.423 Since the financial crisis is ending, from now on there should be more discussion 
regarding the need for other EU agencies and further EU centralisation. 
The Court has on several occasions held that it is not willing to disregard the strict 
admissibility requirements of Article 263 TFEU. This has been criticized by academics, 
practitioners and Advocate Generals at the Court, since it may amount to denial of justice or even 
encourage individuals to break the law in order to have access to the Court. Therefore, the next 
Treaty amendments should deal with this issue of admissibility of individuals under Article 263 
TFEU.424 Regarding any possible future crisis in the EU, the Court should be wary of the impact of 
its judgements and the precedent they set for the future functioning of the EU. An ECB with broad 
mandate may be preferred during a crisis, however it should be borne in mind that the ECB will 
keep that broad mandate after the crisis. This also applies for the broad application of Article 114 
TFEU. In such cases, the Court should stress, if possible, that that situation is a rare exception 
happening under exceptional circumstances. Indeed, the Court has on several occasions done 
that during this financial crisis.425
423 For the differences between democratic and technocratic EU, see M. Kurki, Democracy through Technocracy? 
Reflections on Technocratic Assumptions in EU Democracy Promotion Discourse, Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding (Routledge, 2011), p. 227.
424 Notwithstanding that ‘The Lisbon Treaty provides the Union with a stable and lasting institutional framework. 
We expect no change in the foreseeable future…’ - Presidency Conclusions 16616/1/07 REV 1, 14.12.2007, point 6.
425 See inter alia, case ESMA (n 314), para. 108.
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